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 2 
Introduction 
 Like many other industrialized nations, the United States has traditionally favored 
arbitration for resolution of investment disputes with foreign host states, particularly with 
respect to expropriation claims.  The past decade, however, has seen a noticeable sea 
change in outlook.  Congress has enacted trade legislation giving evidence of an intention 
to restrict arbitration in investment treaties.  And open criticism of investment arbitration 
has been voiced by significant elements of the media, as well as advocacy groups that 
focus on environmental and regulatory issues.   
 The cause of this attitude shift is not difficult to find.  In 1994 the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) entered into force,1 bringing with it an adjudicatory 
regime that gives investors the right to require arbitration of disputes arising out of 
investments in another member country, in connection with matters such as 
expropriation, discrimination and unfair treatment.  The United States and Canada each 
became respondents pursuant to claims brought by investors from the other country.2  
 The result was an awareness of the down-side of arbitration, including the 
prospect that key economic and political matters would be decided in confidential 
                                                 
1  North American Free Trade Agreement, 32 I.L.M. 289, 1993 WL 574441.  NAFTA 
was enacted in the U.S. on 8 December 1993, 107 Stat. 2057. 
2  Thus far Mexico seems to have been principally on the receiving end of investment 
claims.  The one well-known arbitration that Mexico did initiate against the United States 
(In the Matter of Cross-Border Trucking Services) was brought under the provisions of 
NAFTA Chapter 20, relating to state-to-state arbitration, rather than the Chapter 11 
mechanism (discussed infra) for claims brought by private investors.  See Final Report, 
NAFTA Panel Established Pursuant to Chapter Twenty in the Matter of Cross-Border 
Trucking Services (Secretariat File No. USA-MEX-98-2008-01), 6 February 2001. 
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proceedings by a tribunal consisting in majority of foreigners.  In the United States, 
however, the new face of investment arbitration caused a shiver of apprehension.  Media 
attacks and legislative initiatives were launched with the aim of hobbling the neutral 
adjudicatory process which for years had served to underpin investor confidence in the 
protection of investments abroad.   
 This Article suggests that arbitration under investment treaties such as NAFTA 
will enhance the type of asset protection that facilitates wealth-creating cross-border 
capital flows, bringing net gains for both host state and foreign investor.  While there 
may be benefits from minor tinkering with this investment protection regime, general 
attacks on investment arbitration are likely to backfire, creating for all countries involved 
more problems than they solve. 
I. The Contours of Investment Arbitration 
A. Historical Context 
 NAFTA brings investment arbitration full circle, to a time more than two 
centuries ago when the United States was principally a debtor nation.  In 1794 the so-
called “Jay Treaty” (named for its American negotiator John Jay, later Chief Justice of 
the U.S. Supreme Court) gave British creditors the right to arbitrate claims of alleged 
despoliation by American citizens and residents.3   
                                                 
3  Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, London, 19 November 1794, U.S.-U.K., 8 
Stat. 116.  The treaty addressed difficulties arising from the 1783 Treaty of Paris ending 
the American Revolution. Under Article 6, damages for British creditors were to be 
determined by five Commissioners.  Two were appointed by the British and two by the 
United States, with the fifth chosen unanimously by the others, in default of which 
selection would be by lot from between two candidates, one proposed by each side.  For 
an intriguing comparison of modern investment arbitration and the Jay Treaty, see Barton 
Legum, Federalism, NAFTA Chapter Eleven and the Jay Treaty of 1794, 18 ICSID News 
(Spring 2001) (Remarks presented at panel discussion on “Investment Disputes and 
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 More recently, however, it was African and Latin American nations that were 
required by multinational corporations to submit investment disputes to arbitration, either 
through arbitration clauses contained in custom-tailored concession agreements or 
through bilateral and multilateral investment treaties.4  Such arbitration has often 
implicated natural resources and elements of industrial infrastructure no less critical to 
the economic sovereignty and well-being of those countries than the NAFTA cases that 
have caused controversy in the United States and Canada.  
 During the late 19th and early 20th century, developing countries often perceived 
investment arbitration as little more than an extension of gunboat diplomacy.  Investor 
nations were seen to control the arbitral process in a way that permitted it to be used 
simply as a tool for extracting concessions from the host country.  In state-to-state 
proceedings, private investors participated only vicariously through their governments.  
Latin American states were often forced to submit disputes to European sovereigns such 
as Britain’s Queen Victoria, Russia’s Tsar Alexander II, Germany’s Kaiser Wilhelm II 
                                                                                                                                                 
NAFTA Chapter 11” at 95th Annual Meeting of the American Society of International 
Law, Washington, D.C., 4-7 April 2001.  .  The best known of these arbitrations was the 
Alabama Claims case.  In 1872 an arbitral tribunal composed of five arbitrators 
(American, British, Italian, Swiss and Brazilian) awarded more than $ 15 million dollars 
to the United States for damages caused by Britain’s violation of the laws of war in 
allowing its nationals to build warships in British ports for the Southern Confederacy 
during the American Civil War.  Alabama Claims Case, Decision and Award (14 Sept. 
1872), reprinted in THOMAS WILLING BALCH, THE ALABAMA ARBITRATION 131 app. 
(1900) See generally, J. L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 285-288 (1963) 
4  Treaty-based arbitration might take place under the auspices of the World Bank’s 
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (discussed infra) or one of 
the many Bilateral Investment Treaties. See generally  RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGRETE 
STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES (1995); Eloïse Obadia, ICSID, Investment 
Treaties and Arbitration:  Current and Emerging Issues, 18 NEWS FROM ICSID 14 
(Autumn 2001); Matthew Cobb, Development of Arbitration in Foreign Investment, 16 
INT’L ARB. REP. 48 (April 2001); Kazutake Okuma, Investment Disputes Settlement, 34 
SEINAN LAW REVIEW 75 (2002). 
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and King Léopold I of Belgium, whose predispositions and sympathies did not always 
inspire confidence among developing countries.5  
 Not surprisingly, host states reacted to what they perceived as foreign control of 
their economies.  Invoking principles articulated by the 19th century Argentine jurist 
Carlos Calvo, Latin American countries came to require similar treatment for foreign and 
domestic investors. 6  This effectively eliminated as options both diplomatic protection7 
and arbitration.  In 1974 the Calvo doctrine was pushed further in the so-called “New 
International Economic Order” adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in an 
attempt (unsuccessful as history has shown8) to require host state courts rather than 
international arbitrators to determine the measure of compensation for expropriated 
property.9  
                                                 
5 See survey in Lionel M. Summers, Arbitration and Latin America, 3 CAL. W. L. J. 1 
(2001), at 6-7. 
6 Calvo first announced his doctrine in 1868, in LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL THÉORIQUE ET 
PRATIQUE.  The principle that foreign nations should not intervene in South America to 
protect private property and debts included several elements:  investor submission to 
local jurisdiction and local law, waiver of home state protection and surrender of rights 
under customary public international law. See generally, Kurt Lipstein, The Place of the 
Calvo Clause in International Law, 1945 BRITISH YEAR BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
130 (concluding at 145 that “before international tribunals the Calvo Clause is 
ineffective”).   
7  See discussion supra at --. 
8 Thomas Waelde, Requiem for New International Order, in LIBER AMICORUM FOR I. 
SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN 771 (G. Hafner et al.  eds. 1998).  
9  Charter of Rights and Duties of States, Article 2(2)(c), provides that compensation 
should be “appropriate” as determined under “the domestic law of the nationalizing State 
and by its tribunals.”  See William W. Park, Legal Issues in the Third World's Economic 
Development, 61 B. U. L. REV. 1321 (1981).  This principle was rejected in Texaco 
Overseas Petroleum Co. (TOPCO)/California Asiatic Oil Co. (CALASIATIC) v. Libya, 17 
I.L.M. 1 (1978). See also Libyan American Oil Co (LIAMCO) v. Libya, 482 F. Supp. 
1175 (D.D.C. 1980), vac’d without op., 684 F.2d 1032 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
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 Ultimately an increasing number of capital importing countries came to realize 
that their self-interest was served by agreeing to arbitrate investment disputes.  Equally as 
significant, arbitration became a fairer process.  Representatives from developing 
countries began to participate more actively in international arbitral institutions such as 
the ICC, ICSID and the LCIA, as well as in the formulation of new procedural rules such 
as those of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).10   
 Developing countries also came to realize that the greater the risk, the higher the 
cost of investment.  Untrustworthy enforcement mechanisms tend to chill cross-border 
economic cooperation to the detriment of those countries that depend most on foreign 
capital for development.  To the extent that arbitration promotes respect for implicit 
bargains between investor and host country, it came to commend itself to developing 
countries as a matter of sound international economic policy. 
B. Double Standards 
 To some observers a double standard toward investment arbitration seems to be 
creeping into American attitudes toward investment arbitration.11  Arbitration is good 
                                                 
10  See Chapter 36, W. LAURENCE CRAIG, WILLIAM W. PARK & JAN PAULSSON, 
INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBITRATION 661-678) (3d Ed., 2000).  On the 
working of UNCITRAL, see HOWARD HOLTZMANN & JOSEPH E. NEUHAUS, A GUIDE TO 
THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 4-6 
(1989).  
11  Some may be reminded of the Jules Romains character who liked honesty “but only in 
others.”  The French novelist described a foreign emissary who helped himself to a share 
of the bribes his government paid newspapers, but was shocked that intermediaries had 
skimmed from these payments. Romains writes, “M. Choubersky, lequel sans doute se 
charge de prélever sur ces millions une gorgée abondante, semble trouver mauvais que 
les intermédiaires aient une soif parente de la sienne.  C’est un homme qui aime 
l’honnêteté d’autrui.”  (“Mr. Choubersky, who doubtlessly undertook to deduct from 
these millions a large mouthful for himself, seemed to take it ill that the intermediaries 
had a thirst equal to his own.  He is a man who likes honesty in others. ”) JULES 
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when it corrects misbehavior by foreign host states, but not so desirable when claims are 
filed for alleged wrongdoing by the United States.  Many business and political leaders 
still support arbitration as the preferred method to resolve disputes between host countries 
and foreign investors.  However, recent trade legislation has significantly impaired the 
vigor of future treaty-based arbitration of investment disputes, with the United States 
pursuing a course and a tone quite different from when negotiating NAFTA.12  Moreover, 
vocal opposition to investment arbitration has been expressed by important segments of 
the media and several non-governmental organizations.   
 Traditionally, American multinationals imposed arbitration as the mechanism for 
settling investment disputes with foreign countries, particularly in Latin America.  
Arbitration was justified as a way to level the playing field and to reduce the prospect of  
host state “home town justice,” thereby safeguarding assets from expropriation without 
compensation.  Foreign investment was seen as a net good for both investor and host 
state, helping to reduce poverty through international economic cooperation.  And 
arbitration was perceived as one way to promote respect for the rule of law underpinning 
investment stability. 
 The argument ran as follows.  No supranational courts possess mandatory 
jurisdiction to decide the appropriate indemnity for nationalized assets.13 Absent 
                                                                                                                                                 
ROMAINS, LES HOMMES DE BONNE VOLONTE (1958), Part 9 (Montée des Périls) Section 
XXX (Réponse de Marc Strigelius) (Robert Laffont Edition, 1988, Volume II, at 335). 
12  See discussion infra of Trade Act of 2002.  See also Edward Allen, “Washington 
Alters Line on US Investor Protection,”  Financial Times, 2 October 2002, at 13, 
describing how the United States in its bilateral trade negotiations with Chile and 
Singapore has attempted to limit the legal recourse available to investors who believe 
their property has been expropriated without compensation by foreign host states.  
13  The experience of the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) is limited both by tradition 
and by jurisdictional constraints.  For one commercial case that did reach the ICJ, see 
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assertions of diplomatic protection,14 litigation in the expropriating country remains the 
default mechanism for adjudicating investment disputes.15  Consequently, the real or 
imagined bias of host country judges can create an anxiety that inhibits wealth-creating 
transactions and discourages cross-border economic cooperation,16 and will inevitably 
either thwart cross-border economic cooperation or add to its cost.17 
 Arbitration responds to this apprehension by providing a forum that is more 
neutral than host country courts, both politically and procedurally.  The relative 
impartiality of international tribunals bolsters investor confidence and inspires greater 
certainty that the contract will be interpreted in line with the parties’ shared ex ante 
expectations. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Elettronica Sicula SPA (ELSI) (United States v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15 (1989) (finding no 
illegal taking of property when Italy requisitioned plant and equipment owned by US 
nationals in order to prevent planned liquidation).   
14  Diplomatic protection involves state-to-state claims in which a foreign investor 
invokes his country’s intervention against the host state.  Traditional perspectives on 
diplomatic protection are discussed in J. L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 285-288 
(1963); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 465-95 (2d ed. 
1972). 
15  In most cases one would expect investors to prefer arbitration to the more cumbersome 
process of having their country assert diplomatic protection.  Exceptions might arise 
when the legal basis of the claim was weak and the investor state had a degree of clout 
with the host country.   
16  The perception of litigation bias may be as significant as its reality. A study of US 
federal civil actions between 1986 and 1994 found that foreigners actually fared better 
than domestic parties.  See Kevin Clermont and Theodore Eisenberg, Xenophilia in 
American Courts, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1122, 1133–34 (1996).  One explanation for this 
finding lies in a fear of judicial and jury partiality that leads foreign litigants to settle 
rather than continue to final judgment unless their cases are particularly strong. 
17  To illustrate, imagine an attractive investment abroad in Country X where there is 
doubt that local courts will be fair to a foreign party, and another efficient opportunity in 
the investor’s home country.  Depending on the size of the disparity between the 
expected returns, many risk-averse merchants will choose the lower return coupled with 
the fairer legal system.  See generally William W. Park, Neutrality, Predictability and 
Economic Cooperation, 12 (No. 4)  J. INT'L ARB. 99 (1995). 
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 When NAFTA came into force, however, the rifle sights were turned in the 
opposite direction, and the United States and Canada became respondents in cases 
brought by investors based in other NAFTA countries.18  After claims for unfair 
treatment were filed against the United States government, arbitration looked different 
than when American companies were the investors.19  This was a new experience, since 
NAFTA represented the first time two of the so-called “G-7” industrialized countries20 
entered into mandatory arbitration arrangements with each other.21   
 Interestingly, role reversal for the United States and Canada occurred not because 
investors from Mexico (a traditional host state) began bringing claims against its northern 
neighbors.  Rather, it was Canada and the United States that began attacking each other, 
with claims by Canadian investors against the American government, and claims by 
American investors against Canada.22 
                                                 
18 NAFTA Chapter 11 protects “investors of another Party” (Article 1101), defined in 
Article 1139 to include “a national or an enterprise of such Party.”  See also general 
definitions of Article 201, including as an “enterprise of a Party” an enterprise 
“constituted or organized under the law of a Party.”  
19 See Charles Brower & Lee Steven, Who Then Should Judge?: Developing the 
International Rule of Law under NAFTA Chapter 11, 2 CHI. J. INT’L. L. 93 (2001); 
Charles H. Brower, II, Investor-State Disputes Under NAFTA:  A Tale of Fear and 
Equilibrium, 29 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 43 (2001); Charles H. Brower, II, Structure, 
Legitimacy and NAFTA’s Investment Chapter, 36 VANDERBILT J. TRANSN’L L. 37 (2003).  
20  Beginning in 1986, the finance ministers and central bank governors of seven major 
industrialized countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy Japan, the United States and the 
United Kingdom) began meeting in order to improve communication and cooperation on 
matters related to economic and financial growth, inflation and currency developments. 
In 1997 the summit became known as the G-8 to reflect Russia's participation, 
particularly in discussions on ways to combat the financing of terrorism. 
21  Prior to NAFTA, investment arbitration implicated claims by nationals of 
industrialized countries against developing nations pursuant to bilateral investment 
treaties.  Although the treaty obligations flowed both ways, the investment did not. 
22  See discussion infra. 
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 As Americans and Canadians began to understand the host state perspective, 
praise for arbitration’s neutrality began to have competition in the form of complaints 
about infringement of national sovereignty and democracy.  The level playing field no 
longer appeared as an unalloyed benefit.  Environmental and consumer groups, as well as 
the media and Congress, began taking the position that NAFTA undermined legitimate 
governmental regulations, challenged legislative prerogatives and opened decision-
making to ill-informed foreign tribunals.23   
 The NAFTA process was attacked for the confidentiality of its proceedings (“lack 
of transparency”), uncertainty and absence of accountability to domestic constituents.  A 
dispute resolution process that had been fair for the rest of the world came to be seen as a 
tool to put business before public interest.   
 In the present climate of public opinion, many Americans and Canadians fail to 
understand why arbitration should be available for foreign investors.  Taking for granted 
the fairness of their own judicial systems, Americans in particular are often surprised that 
not everyone feels comfortable with civil juries and the prospect of large punitive 
damages.24 
                                                 
23  See discussion infra. 
24 For evidence of foreign fear of litigation bias in American courts, see discussion infra 
of the Loewen case and findings reported in Kevin Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, 
discussed supra.  American commentators have also expressed doubts and concerns 
about civil juries and punitive damages.  See, e.g., Robert A. Klinck, The Punitive 
Damage Debate, 38 HARV. J. LEGIS. 469 (2001); Theodore Eisenberg, Neil LaFountain, 
Brian Ostrom, David Rottman & Martin T. Wells, Juries, Judges and Punitive Damages: 
An Empirical Study, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 743 (2003); David A. Schkade, Erratic by 
Design:  A Task Analysis of Punitive Damages Assessment, 39 HARV. J. LEGIS. 121 
(2002); Stephen J. Ware, Consumer and Employment Arbitration Law in Comparative 
Perspective:  The Importance of the Civil Jury, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 865 (2002); Richard 
W. Murphy, Punitive Damages, Explanatory Verdicts and the Hard Look, 76 WASH. L. 
REV. 995 (2001); Lisa Litwiller, Has the Supreme Court Sounded the Death Knell for 
 11 
 Regardless of whether such self-perceptions are valid, the fact remains that when 
NAFTA was being negotiated, it was the United States that insisted on arbitration as a 
protection for foreign investment. The business community’s longstanding hesitation 
toward foreign litigation made it vital to bolster confidence that investors would receive a 
“fair shake” in the event of controversy with the host government. 
 NAFTA also stipulated substantive standards of investor protection that would 
require interpretation. Reciprocal lack of trust among the three countries made it unlikely 
that host state courts would be acceptable to construe and apply these standards. 
 Understandably, this investor protection scheme was based upon equality of 
treatment among the three countries.  For Mexico to accept arbitration of investment 
disputes within its borders, Canada and the United States had to respect a similar dispute 
resolution process. It would have been unwise and unworkable for Chapter 11 to be 
applied by American and Canadian courts when claims were brought against the United 
States and Canada, but to have arbitrators appointed for claims against Mexico.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Jury Assessed Punitive Damages?  A Critical Re-Examination of the American Jury, 
36 U.S.F.L. REV. 411 (2002); W. Kip Viscusi, Punitive Damages:  How Jurors Fail to 
Promote Efficiency, 39 HARV. J. LEGIS. 139 (2002); John J. Kircher, Punitive Damages 
and Business Organizations:  A Pathetic Fallacy, 67 Tenn. Rev. 971 (2000); Perry E. 
Casazza, Nevada’s Mastrobuono:  How the 2001 Legislature Threw Another Wrench into 
the Punitive Damages Machines of Arbitration Law, 51 DRAKE L. REV. 189 (2002); 
Michelle L. Hartmann, Is It a Short Trip Back to Manor Farm?  A Study of Judicial 
Attitudes and Behaviors Concerning the Civil Jury System, 54 S.M.U.L. REV.  1827 
(2001); Valerie P. Hans, U.S. Jury Reform:  The Active Jury and the Adversarial Ideal, 
21 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 85 (2002); Valerie P. Hans, The Illusions and Realities of 
Jurors’ Treatment of Corporate Defendants, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 327 (1998). 
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II. NAFTA Chapter 11 
A. Safeguarding Cross-Border Investment25 
 NAFTA Chapter 11 gives business managers from a member country the 
opportunity to arbitrate investment grievances with the government of another NAFTA 
country, regardless of whether an agreement to arbitrate actually exists in a negotiated 
investment concession.26  This private right to direct action eliminates recourse to 
traditional state-to-state negotiations, in which a foreign investor asks for his country’s 
intervention against the host state.   
 The first part of Chapter 11 (Section A) imposes the substantive norms for cross-
border investment, forbidding discrimination against investors from another member 
country,27 and requiring “fair and equitable” treatment as well as compensation for 
                                                 
25 See generally Henri C. Alvarez, Arbitration Under the North American Free Trade 
Agreement, 16 ARB. INT’L 393 (2000); Axelle Lemaire, Le Nouveau visage de l’arbitrage 
entre état et investisseur étranger:  le chapitre 11 de l’ALENA, 2001 REV. ARB. 43; Todd 
Weiler, Substantive Law Developments in NAFTA Arbitration, 16 INT’L ARB. REP. 69 
(December 2001); Leon Trakman, Arbitrating Investment Disputes Under NAFTA, 18(4) 
J. INT’L ARB. 385 (2001); William S. Dodge, National Courts and International 
Arbitration:  Exhaustion of Remedies and Res Judicata Under Chapter Eleven of NAFTA, 
23 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 357 (2000); Patrick Dumberry, The NAFTA 
Investment Dispute Settlement Mechanism: A Review of the Latest Case Law, 2 J. WORLD 
INVESTMENT 151 (2001); Todd Weiler, NAFTA Investment Arbitration and the Growth of 
International Economic Law, 36 CANADIAN BUS. L. J. 405 (2002); Chris Tollefson, 
Games Without Frontiers:  Investor Claims and Citizen Submissions Under the NAFTA 
Regime, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 141 (2002). 
26  See generally Todd Weiler, The Ethyl Arbitration:  First of Its Kind and a Harbinger 
of Things to Come, 11 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 187 (2000). 
27 Each member country must treat NAFTA investors and their investments no less 
favorably that its own investors (Article 1102, concerning National Treatment) and 
investors of other countries (Article 1103, concerning Most-Favored-Nation Treatment). 
In S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada a Partial Award of 13 November 2000 
articulated the national treatment standard to require consideration as to whether the 
NAFTA investor is in the same “economic and business sector” as the national investor.  
A measure breaches the national treatment standard if (i) it creates a disproportionate 
benefit for nationals over non-nationals, (ii) the measure, on its face, appears to favor 
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nationalized property.28  An entity incorporated and with substantial business activities29 
in a NAFTA country qualifies as an investor without regard to any “origin of capital” 
limitations.30  Thus a Mexican corporation owned by French shareholders qualifies as an 
investor under NAFTA Chapter 11. 
 The compensation criteria adopted by NAFTA Chapter 11 were intended to be 
compatible with standards traditionally advocated by the United States.31  Expropriation 
                                                                                                                                                 
nationals over non-nationals and (iii) there must be a practical impact required, not 
merely motive or intent. Political subdivisions must provide foreign investors no less 
favorable treatment than the best treatment accorded to investors of the country to which 
the subdivision belongs.  For example, Massachusetts must treat investors from Québec 
no less favorably than it treats investors from New York or Pennsylvania. 
28  Article 1102 prohibits discrimination by requiring “national treatment,” while Article 
1105 requires respect for international law, including “fair and equitable treatment” as a 
minimum standard.  Proper compensation for nationalized property is mandated by 
Article 1110. 
29 See article 1113(2). 
30 See definitions in Articles 201 and 1139.  Moreover, standing to bring a claim may be 
based on citizenship regardless of residence.  See interim award in Feldman (a.k.a. 
Karpa) v. United Mexican States, 40 I.L.M. 615 (2001), which determined inter alia that 
permanent residence in Mexico did not deprive a US citizen of the right to arbitrate 
claims concerning tobacco export tax rebates. 
31 While the terms “prompt, adequate and effective” do not appear in the text of Chapter 
11, some observers consider the combination of Article 1110 factors (“paid without 
delay,” “fair market value” and “fully realizable”) to amount to the same result.   See 
Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations Law § 712, comments c and d, and Reporter’s 
note 2 (1987) stating that for compensation to be “just” it must be “paid at the time of 
taking,” “in an amount equivalent to the value of the property taken” and “in a form 
economically usable by the foreign national.”  The expression “prompt, adequate and 
effective” originates in a communication to Mexico from US Secretary of State Cordell 
Hull on 22 August 1938.  See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 
F.2d  875, 888 (2d Cir. 1981).  Compare the standard under Restatement § 712 with the 
United Nations’ Charter of Rights and Duties of States Art 2(2)(c), providing that 
compensation should be “appropriate” as determined under “the domestic law of the 
nationalizing State and by its tribunals.”  See William W. Park, Legal Issues in the Third 
World’s Economic Development, 61 B.U. L. REV. 1321 (1981). 
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must be justified by a public purpose and applied on a non-discriminatory basis.32  
Compensation must be “equivalent to the fair market value” of the investment at the date 
of expropriation, must be “paid without delay and be fully realizable,” and must bear 
interest at a commercially reasonable rate until the date of actual payment.  If paid other 
than in a hard currency,33 compensation must be in an amount which, at market rates of 
exchange, would convert into a sum no less than the hard currency equivalent of market 
value on the payment date. Compensation will not be affected because market awareness 
of the pending expropriation drove down the property’s price.34 
The second portion of Chapter 11 (Section B) goes on to provide arbitration as a 
remedy for a host state’s breach of its duties.   An aggrieved investor35 may choose either 
(i) arbitration supervised by the International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (“ICSID”) (part of the World Bank group),36 or  (ii) a proceeding conducted 
                                                 
32  NAFTA Article 1110(1) adopts a four-part structure, requiring that the expropriation 
(1) have a public purpose, (2) be applied on a non-discriminatory basis, (3) “in 
accordance with due process of law and Article 1105(1)” [“fair and equitable treatment”] 
and (4) result in “payment of compensation in accordance with paragraphs 2 through 6 
[of Article 1110],” which adopt the fair market value standard. 
33 NAFTA Article 1110 speaks of a “G-7 currency,” which includes the currencies of 
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
32 I.L.M. at 641. For France, Germany, and Italy, members of the European Union’s 
common currency union, the currency would now be the Euro. By contrast, the United 
Kingdom at present maintains its own currency. 
34  NAFTA Article 1110(2) provides that fair market value “shall not reflect any change 
in value occurring because the intended expropriation had become known earlier.”  
35 Claims may be made either directly or on behalf of an enterprise owned by the investor 
under NAFTA Article 1116. 
36 Established under the 1965 Washington Convention (“Convention”), ICSID normally 
has jurisdiction over investment disputes between a state that is a party to the Convention 
and an investor from another Convention State.  The Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, 18 March 1965, 
entered into force 14 October 1966.  See generally RUDOLF DOLZER AND MARGRETE 
STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 130-46 (1995); Abby Cohen Smutny, 
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under arbitration rules adopted by the United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law (“UNCITRAL”).37   Disputes raising common questions of fact or law may be 
consolidated into a single arbitration.38 
 Should the investor want ICSID arbitration there is a slight limitation.  Neither 
Mexico nor Canada is yet party to the Washington Convention establishing ICSID.  
Consequently ICSID-style arbitration must proceed under the so-called ICSID Additional 
Facility designed for cases in which the Washington Convention does not apply.  As 
discussed below, this will have significant consequences when one side wishes to mount 
a challenge to the arbitration. 
B. The Role of the Arbitral Situs 
1. Current Alternatives 
 When a dissatisfied loser in NAFTA arbitration seeks to have an award set aside, 
the choice of arbitral forum may have a significant impact on the role played by courts at 
the arbitral situs.39  To understand the impact of local law, a brief contrast might be 
helpful.  Under “pure” ICSID arbitration, the Washington Convention forecloses 
                                                                                                                                                 
Arbitration Before the International Centre for Investment Disputes, 3 BUSINESS LAW 
INT’L 367 (September 2002). 
37  NAFTA Article 1120. Unless otherwise agreed, the place of arbitration must be in the 
territory of a country that is a party to both NAFTA and the New York Arbitration 
Convention.  See NAFTA Article 1130, referring to a “Party [a NAFTA member] that is 
a party to the New York Convention.” 
38  Article 1126. 
39  See generally David Williams, Challenging Investment Treaaty Arbitration Awards:  
Issues Concerning the Forum, presented at ICCA Congress XVI (London, 15 May 2002).  
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challenge to awards on normal statutory grounds40 in favor of ICSID’s special system of 
quality control under its own internal challenge procedure.41 
 However, since Canada and Mexico are not parties to the Washington 
Convention, investors currently have only two options for arbitral procedure:  (i) the 
United Nations’ UNCITRAL Rules, which is entirely ad hoc, and (ii) the ICSID 
Additional Facility, supervised by ICSID but outside its treaty framework.   
 Whether under the UNCITRAL or Additional Facility Rules, arbitration will go 
forward within the framework of either the New York Convention42 or the Panama 
Convention,43 both of which require deference to valid arbitration agreements and awards 
but say nothing about proper or improper annulment standards.44  In contrast to ICSID, 
                                                 
40  For ICSID arbitration in the United States, this rule has never been tested in a court 
action raising the conflict between the Federal Arbitration Act (allowing motions to 
vacate awards) and the Washington Convention (which excludes such vacatur).  The US 
Constitution in Article VI (2) lists both treaties and federal statutes as the “supreme Law 
of the Land,” without establishing a hierarchy.  On some matters statutes clearly override 
treaties.  See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 96-499 § 1125, providing that no treaty shall require 
“exemption from (or reduction of) any tax imposed” on gains from disposition of US 
realty. When Congress is silent courts look to canons of statutory interpretation such as 
“last in time prevails” or “specific restricts general.”  See Detlev Vagts, The United States 
and its Treaties:  Observance and Breach, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 313 (2001). 
41 See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and 
Nationals of Other States Article 52, ICSID Basic Documents 25 (1985).  See generally 
W. MICHAEL REISMAN, SYSTEMS OF CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION AND 
ARBITRATION 46–50 (Duke 1992). 
42 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 330 
U.N.T.S. 38, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997 (1958). 
43 Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration of 1975, set forth 
in 9 U.S.C. Chapter III. 
44 At present the United States and Mexico, but not Canada, are parties to the Panama 
Convention.  In the United States, when both Conventions are applicable, the Panama 
Convention prevails. See 9 U.S.C. § 305. While similar in their basic structure, the New 
York and Panama Conventions differ in significant respects.  For example, the Panama 
Convention does not require judges to refer parties to arbitration, or set forth conditions 
that must be satisfied by the party seeking award enforcement.  Moreover, only the 
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the New York and Panama Conventions leave each country free to establish its own 
grounds for vacating awards made within its territory.   
 The consequence of arbitration under the rules of UNCITRAL or the Additional 
Facility is that NAFTA awards are now subject to the judicial review mechanisms that 
exist at the place of arbitration.45  NAFTA Article 1136(3)(b) explicitly contemplates 
such review.  Award enforcement for arbitration under “Additional Facility” or 
UNCITRAL rules may not be sought until a court either dismisses or allows an 
application to revise, set aside, or annul the award and there is no further appeal, or three 
months have elapsed without such application being made. 
2. Metalclad  
 The much-discussed Metalclad case46  illustrates the role currently given to the 
arbitral situs, by which judicial scrutiny of awards varies in function of the monitoring 
                                                                                                                                                 
Panama Convention contains reference to arbitration rules (those of the Inter-American 
Commercial Arbitration Commission) that apply in default of party choice.  See generally 
Albert Jan van den Berg, The New York Convention 1958 and Panama Convention 1975:  
Redundancy or Compatibility?, 4 ARB. INT’L 229 (1989); John Bowman, The Panama 
Convention and Its Implementation under the Federal Arbitration Act, 11 AM. REV. INT’L 
ARB. 116 (2000). 
45  In the United States award “finality” has been interpreted to mean final as allowed 
under relevant arbitration laws. See, for example, M&C Corp. v. Erwin Behr GmbH & 
Co., KG, 87 F.3d 844, 847 (6th Cir. 1996); Iran Aircraft Industries v. Avco Corp., 980 
F.2d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 1992). Compare the situation in Ontario.  In Noble China Inc. v. 
Lei, 42 Ont. Rep. (3d) 69, 87 (1998) the UNCITRAL Model Law exclusion of judicial 
review was deemed to foreclose a motion to set aside an award, although the court noted 
that evidence of bias might have led to a different result.  The authors are not aware of 
any analogous interpretations of award “finality” in Mexico, which adopted the 
UNCITRAL Model Law in June 1993.  
46 See Metalclad v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award of 
30 August 2000, reprinted in 16 INT’L ARB. REP. 62 (January 2001), finding 
expropriation without adequate compensation where a U.S.-owned company was 
prevented by a Mexican municipality from operating a hazardous waste facility in 
Mexico. See Clyde Pearce & Jack Coe, Arbitration under NAFTA Chapter 11—Some 
Pragmatic Reflections Upon the First Case Filed Against Mexico,  23 HASTINGS INT’L & 
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standards deemed appropriate by the relevant court.  An “Additional Facility” award had 
granted damages to an American company for expropriation of a hazardous waste 
disposal facility. Regulatory action by a Mexican municipality had prevented a subsidiary 
of a US company from operating. Arbitrators had found that Mexican regulatory action 
denied “fair and equitable treatment” and constituted expropriation without adequate 
compensation.  Mexico then petitioned to have the award set aside by the British 
Columbia Supreme Court, which had jurisdiction by virtue of the arbitration’s official 
situs fixed in Vancouver.47  
 As a preliminary matter the court had to decide between application of two 
different provincial arbitration statutes.  The International Commercial Arbitration Act 
(based on the UNCITRAL Model Law) provides a relatively narrow scope of review, 
while the Commercial Arbitration Act  (which catches arbitration excluded from the 
International Act) allows a more generous role for court intervention, including appeal on 
points of law.   
 Surprisingly, the choice turned on the meaning of “commercial” rather than 
“international.”  The International Act requires that the arbitration be commercial as well 
as international.  Mexico argued against application of the International Act on the 
ground that the arbitration related to a regulatory rather than commercial relationship.   
                                                                                                                                                 
COMP. L. REV. 311 (2001); Todd Weiler, Metalclad v. Mexico:  A Play in Three Parts, 2 
J. WORLD INVESTMENT 685 (2001).  For the British Columbia decision on vacatur, see 
United Mexican States v. Metalclad, Vancouver Court Registry Case No. L 002904, Mr. 
Justice Tysoe, decided 2 May 2001, reprinted in 16 INT’L ARB. REP. A-1 (May 2001). 
47  For convenience, hearings had been held in Washington D.C. 
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 The court disagreed, finding that the arbitration was commercial in the sense that 
it “arose out of a relationship of investing.”48  Characterizing the arbitration by reference 
to the underlying transaction (a cross-border investment) placed the dispute within the 
terms of the International Act, which meant that court scrutiny focused on whether the 
award exceeded the arbitrators’ powers or violated public policy.  
 As to the substance of the challenge, the Canadian court found that some but not 
all of the arbitrators’ findings exceeded their jurisdiction.  In particular, the court held 
that the tribunal went beyond its authority in finding that Mexico breached a NAFTA 
requirement of “transparency” in the sense that investment requirements should be 
knowable and free from doubt.  In finding a transparency requirement, the arbitral 
tribunal “did not simply interpret the wording of Article 1105 [but] misstated the 
applicable law ... and then made its decision on [that] basis.”49  Nevertheless, the court 
upheld the bulk of the award, given that one prong of the arbitrators’ reasoning fell within 
their jurisdiction.50  Consequently, only a portion of the award (dealing with interest) was 
set aside and remitted for recalculation.51 
                                                 
48 See British Columbia Slip Opinion at para. 44. 
49 Id., para. 70.  This aspect of the case presents an example of how the line between 
excess of jurisdiction and simple error of law is often quite thin.  The concept of 
transparency had been defined earlier in the decision at para. 28. 
50  The court agreed that the arbitrators were correct in resting their decision on an 
“ecological decree” as tantamount to expropriation.  Thus excess of authority was 
deemed to exist in only two out of the three breaches of NAFTA found by the arbitrators.  
51  This decision has caused some scholars to argue in favor of a supra-national appellate 
mechanism to replace review of awards by national courts.  See Jack J. Coe, Jr., Domestic 
Court Control of Investment Awards -- Necessary Evil or Achilles Heel within NAFTA 
and the Proposed FTAA, 19 J. INT’L ARB. 185 (2002); William S. Dodge, Metalclad 
Corp. v. Mexico, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 910 (2001), at 918. 
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 The practical lesson to be learned from Metalclad is that courts at the place of 
arbitration will have the last word in an arbitration.  Consequently, care should be taken 
in selecting a venue where judges exercise a control function over the arbitration’s basic 
procedural integrity (looking at matters such as bias, excess of authority and due 
process), but do not second guess the arbitrator on the substantive merits of the dispute.52 
 From the American perspective, the decision in Metalclad seemed quite normal.  
An investor from the United States was found to have been treated unfairly by a political 
subdivision of Mexico.  Thus the proper way to resolve the dispute was the relatively 
neutral mechanism of arbitration rather than Mexican courts.  As discussed below, 
however,53 when the shoe is on the other foot perceptions of fairness may be quite 
different.  
C. Investor Protection in Practice 
 Considerable grist for the arbitration mill has been supplied by two particular 
aspects of Chapter 11:  the matters of (i) “minimum standard of treatment” and 
(ii) compensation standards for expropriation.  Several recent cases illustrate the way 
NAFTA has been applied in practice in these areas. 
1. Minimum Standards of Treatment 
 NAFTA Article 1105 (1) requires each country to “accord to investments of 
investors of another Party treatment in accordance with international law, including fair 
and equitable treatment and full protection and security.” Although the meaning of 
                                                 
52 See William W. Park, Duty and Discretion in International Arbitration, 93 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 805 (1999). 
53  See discussion infra. 
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“international law” has been the object of controversy, 54 at least two conclusions seem 
warranted.   First, the “fair and equitable standard” has not been met simply by an 
extension of national or most favored nation treatment to NAFTA investors.  Second, 
reference to “full protection and security” adopts the settled principle that a nation is 
liable for failure to exercise due diligence to prevent injuries to an investor caused by 
third parties.55 
 In Metalclad56 Mexico was held to be in breach of Article 1105(1) as a result of a 
lack of “orderly process” and “timely disposition” in relation to a NAFTA investor acting 
under the expectation that it would be treated fairly and justly in accordance with 
NAFTA.  In S.D. Myers57 treatment of NAFTA investors was held to fall below this 
minimum standard of treatment even in a situation where government conduct was not 
discriminatory.  A breach of Article 1105(1) thus occurs when the NAFTA investor is 
treated in such an unjust or arbitrary manner as to rise to a level unacceptable from the 
international perspective. 
 It is worth noting that several aspects of what might loosely be considered fair 
treatment are the subject of separate NAFTA provisions.  For example, under Article 
1106 a NAFTA country may not “impose or enforce ‘performance requirements’ in 
                                                 
54 See discussion of Free Trade Commission Notes of Interpretation, infra.   
55 IAN BROWNLIE, SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF NATIONS: STATE RESPONSIBILITY (1983) at 
161; ICSID Case ARB/87/3. 
56 Metalclad Corporation v. Government of the United Mexican States, Award of 
25 August 2000, discussed supra. 
57 S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada, Partial Award of 13 November 2000, 
reprinted in 40 I.L.M. 1408 (2001). U.S. investor hoped to capture a large portion of the 
Canadian market for destruction of PCBs by sending materials to Ohio facilities, a 
competitive advantage over Canadian facilities further away. Canadian environmental 
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connection with investments in its territory,” which include achievement of export levels, 
domestic procurement requirements, minimum local content, trade balancing, product 
mandating or the transfer of technology.58  NAFTA also grants investors an explicit right 
to choose senior managers (Article 1107) and the right to convert local currency into 
foreign currency at the prevailing market rate of exchange, in order to repatriate earnings, 
proceeds of a sale, loan repayments or other investment-related transactions (Article 
1109).  
2. Expropriation  
 NAFTA Article 1110 extends protection against un-compensated expropriation to 
measures “tantamount to nationalization or expropriation,” thus encompassing takings 
that have often been referred to as “creeping” expropriation. 59   In all cases compensation 
for expropriation must be paid without delay, be equal to the fair market value of the 
investment prior to the expropriation, include interest, and be fully realizable and freely 
transferable. 
 While “tantamount to expropriation” is not defined in NAFTA, this well-
established concept has been applied to cover not only openly avowed state takings of 
property, but also “other actions that have the effect of ‘taking’ the property, in whole or 
                                                                                                                                                 
authorities responded to Canadian lobbying with an emergency ban preventing export of 
PCB waste.  
58   In two early cases testing this requirement, arbitral tribunals hearing claims against 
Canada have failed to find improper imposition of performance requirements.  See Pope 
& Talbot, Inc. v. Government of Canada, Interim Award on Merits of 26 June 2000; final 
award 31 May 2002 (U.S. investor claimed damages in connection with Canadian 
softwood export prohibitions;  the tribunal dismissed all but the claim that Canada had 
engaged in denial of fair treatment); S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada, Partial 
Award of 13 November 2000 (tribunal found that the export ban in question was not a 
requirement on “the conduct or operation of the investment”). 
59  See discussion infra.  
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in large part, outright or in stages [including] when [a state] subjects alien property to 
taxation, regulation, or other action that is confiscatory, or that prevents, unreasonably 
interferes with, or unduly delays, effective enjoyment of an alien’s property.”60  An 
indirect expropriation may occur if the investor’s expected entitlement to the benefits are 
impaired by host state interference, even if property is not legally taken by the State,61 or 
when the host state itself acquires nothing of value but “at least has been the instrument 
of distribution.”62   
 Several Chapter 11 arbitrations have addressed the question of what constitutes 
expropriation, including Azinian,63 Metalclad,64 Pope & Talbot, 65 and S.D. Myers.66  
Thus far none have departed from traditional notions of customary international law. 
                                                 
60 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, Section 712. 
ICSID cases that have addressed indirect expropriation include Amco Asia Corp. v. 
Republic of Indonesia, ARB/81/1; Liberian E. Timber Corp. v. Government of Liberia, 
ARB/83/2 and Southern Pacific Properties Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ARB/84/3. 
See generally references to works by Dolzer, Higgins and Weston cited infra. 
61 Istvan Posgany, Bilateral Investment Treaties: Some Recent Examples, 1987 FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT LAW JOURNAL 964.  
62 ALLAHYAR MOURI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF EXPROPRIATION AS REFLECTED IN 
THE WORK OF THE IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIBUNAL (1994) at 66; Poehlmann v. Spinnerei 
AG, 3 U.S. Ct. Rest. App. 701, 702-04, 710 (1952). 
63 Robert Azinian v. United Mexican States, Award on Merits, 1 November 1999, 14 
ICSID REVIEW / FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW REVIEW 568.  U.S. investors contracted with 
a local municipality to provide waste treatment services. The tribunal concluded that the 
claimant had not shown the Mexican actions to be illegal under international law. 
64 Metalclad Corporation v. Government of the United Mexican States, Award on Merits 
of 25 August 2000.  The Tribunal ruled that “Expropriation under NAFTA includes not 
only open, deliberate and acknowledged takings of property, such as outright seizure or 
formal or obligatory transfer of title in favor of the host State, but also covert or 
incidental interference with the use of property which has the effect of depriving the 
owner, in whole or in significant part, of the use or reasonably-to-be-expected economic 
benefit of the property even if not necessarily to the obvious benefit of the host State.” At 
33, para. 103.  The Tribunal also applied an “effects” test and held that the motivation or 
intent of the adoption of an environmental decree was not relevant to a determination 
under NAFTA article 1110. 
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III. Arbitration and the New Host States 
A. Three Illustrations 
 Three Canadian claims against the United States illustrate how a traditional 
investor country has seen the tables turned by mandatory arbitration with foreign 
investors.67  Each case involves complaints about an American state rather than the 
federal government. In Methanex California banned gasoline additives manufactured 
from a feedstock produced by a Canadian company; in Loewen a Mississippi jury 
awarded $500 million against a Manitoba funeral director; and in Mondev the Supreme 
Judicial Court of  Massachusetts upheld the city of Boston in refusing to sell land to a 
Montreal real estate developer.   
 In all three cases American interests were subject to adjudication outside 
American courts.  As discussed later, this question of forum lies at the heart of American 
disquiet over NAFTA Chapter 11. 
                                                                                                                                                 
65 Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Government of Canada, Interim Award on Merits of 26 June 
2000; final award 31 May 2002.  In the Interim Award of June 2000 the Tribunal 
dismissed all but the claim that Canada had denied fair treatment under Article 1105, but 
indicated that “creeping expropriation could be conducted by regulation, and a blanket 
exception for regulatory measures would create a gaping loophole in the international 
protection against expropriation.” Id at 35, para. 99. On whether there was an 
expropriation, the Arbitral Tribunal indicated that the test is “whether the interference is 
sufficiently restricted to support a conclusion that the property has been taken from the 
owner.”   See generally, Patrick Dumberry, The Quest to Define “Fair and Equitable 
Treatment” for Investors under International Law, 3 J. WORLD INVESTMENT 657 (2002). 
66 S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada, Partial Award of 13 November 2000.  The 
tribunal decided that the term “tantamount” in NAFTA article 1110 means “equivalent” 
and is intended to capture acts of creeping expropriation but does not broaden the scope 
of expropriation under customary international law. 
67  The fourth claim against the United States, filed on 19 July 2000 by ADF Group of 
Québec, involved a “Buy American” requirement of the Federal Highway Administration 
that interfered with participation in a Virginia highway project by a Canadian 
manufacturer of complex steel components.   
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 The protest is pregnant with irony when one remembers how often the United 
States has imposed arbitration on other countries,68 and how American negotiators 
advocated arbitration to promote the security of foreign investment over Mexico’s 
longstanding opposition.69 
 Two of the cases (Loewen and Mondev) are of particular significance, in that court 
decisions serve as the hook on which to found a NAFTA claim.  NAFTA not only 
prohibits any “measure” tantamount to expropriation,70 but also gives the term “measure” 
an understandably broad scope, to include “any law, regulation, procedure, requirement 
or practice.”71  Such a reading of the concept of measure is entirely consistent with the 
American position in connection with bilateral investment treaties.72  
 By implicating the judiciary, NAFTA arbitrations obviously touch an especially 
sensitive nerve.  However, such actions follow a long line of  “denial of justice” claims 
                                                 
68  See W. LAURENCE CRAIG, WILLIAM W. PARK & JAN PAULSSON, INTERNATIONAL 
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBITRATION (3d ed. 2000), Chapter 36.  
69 The NAFTA Statement of Administrative Action makes this point: “The NAFTA 
provides a historic investor-state dispute settlement mechanism, so that individual U.S. 
companies no longer face an unbalanced environment in an investment dispute with the 
Mexican government but can seek arbitration outside Mexico by an independent body.” 
See NORTH  AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT, TEXTS OF AGREEMENT, IMPLEMENTING 
BILL, STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION AND REQUIRED SUPPORTING STATEMENTS, 
House Document 103-159, Vol. 1, at 685. 
70  NAFTA Article 1110. 
71  NAFTA Article 201.  Both Loewen and Azinian (discussed supra) rejected the 
suggestion that a judicial action constituted an exclusion to such a broadly defined notion 
of governmental measure.    
72  See VANDEVELDE, UNITED STATES INVESTMENT TREATIES:  POLICY AND PRACTICE, 
Appendix C, at 166, noting the State Department position that bilateral investment treaty 
prohibitions on expropriations apply to “essentially any measure regardless of form” 
which may deprive an investor of important property rights.  
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traditionally brought against developing countries73 and recently made by an American 
investor against Mexico under NAFTA.74 
1. Methanex75  
 When California became concerned about risks to drinking water as a result of 
leakage from underground fuel storage tanks, its Governor banned gasoline containing a 
methanol-based gasoline additive called “MTBE.”76   A Canadian corporation producing 
feedstock for this additive responded by filing an arbitration claim arguing 
                                                 
73  See BRIERLY, supra, at pages 286-87, noting two different views on what constitutes a 
denial of justice, also sometimes referred to as déni de justice.  The narrower 
interpretation (on occasion adopted by Latin American scholars) contends that denial of 
justice exists only when foreigners have been denied access to courts.  The broader view 
(embraced in much English, American and Continental writing) includes substandard 
judicial acts such as corruption, dishonesty, unwarranted delay and decisions imposed by 
the executive.  See also BROWNLIE, supra, at pages 514-16.   
74  See Calmark Commercial Development, Inc. v. United States of Mexico, Notice of 
Intent to Commence Arbitration filed 11 January 2002.  In a case whose beginning brings 
to mind the real estate development in Mondev, an American corporation which had 
agreed to develop a tourist attraction in Mexico ended up paying for land which was 
transferred to a third party.  A lawsuit in the courts of the State of Baja California failed 
to recover the misplaced investment, due to what the American claimant alleged were 
procedural improprieties such as failure to give notice of defendant’s submissions, 
disregard of evidence and “blatantly wrongful and unjust conclusion” in the matter.  Id., 
para. 52.  The NAFTA claim was based on Article 1105:  “treatment in accordance with 
international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security.”  
Supporting authorities cited by the American claimant included the Loewen case 
(discussed infra) and a 1927 American claim against Mexico, United States (Laura Janes) 
v. Mexico (Opinions of Commissioners 108, 1927 General Claims Commission 1926) in 
which non punishment was deemed to constitute approval of wrongdoing. 
75 Methanex Corp. v. USA, Amended Claim filed 12 February 2001 by Jones, Day, 
Reavis & Pogue, Washington, D.C.  Available through www.naftaclaims.com.  
76  It is significant that the Claimant Methanex does not produce MTBE (Methyl tertiary 
butyl ether), but rather the feedstock (methanol) for the banned additive.  This fact seems 
to have played a part in the recent partial award in this case.  The arbitral tribunal appears 
to have posited that the connection between methanol and the ban was too remote in the 
context of NAFTA Article 1101, since the government measure did not apply to the 
investor’s product itself.  The ban was effective 31 December 2001.  See Exec. Order No. 
D-5-99 promulgated by Governor Gray Davis. 
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discrimination, denial of minimum standard of treatment and improper expropriation of 
its investment.77   
 The filing of the claim led to protests by environmentalists and the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).  Charges were made that NAFTA Chapter 11, 
by allowing corporations to recover for unfair treatment, favored corporate profits over 
legitimate exercise of sovereignty by local governments.  This arbitral process was 
attacked as undemocratic, cloaked in secrecy, lacking adequate rights of appeal and 
protection for equally injured domestic producers.  NAFTA was further criticized as 
denying the American public a right to protect its water and air.78 
2. Loewen   
 In Loewen v. USA,79 a Mississippi jury verdict led to claims of failure to grant 
“fair and equitable treatment” and expropriation without adequate compensation.  The 
                                                 
77  Violations were alleged with respect to NAFTA Articles 1102, 1105 and 1110.  
Methanex Corp. Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration Under Article 1119, 
Section B, Chapter 11 of NAFTA, filed 2 July 1999. The arbitration proceeding was 
brought under the UNCITRAL Rules and has already resulted in an interim ruling.  See 
Methanex Corp v. United States, 15 January 2001, 16 Int’l Arb. Rep. D-1 (Jan. 2001), 
Decision on Authority to Accept Amicus Submissions, finding that it “could be 
appropriate” for an environmental group to make submissions.  UNCITRAL Rules 
Article 15(1) permits conduct of the proceedings “in such manner as [the tribunal] 
considers appropriate.” Amicus briefs from NAFTA member countries are permitted 
under NAFTA Article 1128, which authorizes submissions on questions related to 
interpretation of NAFTA. 
78 For a survey of the criticisms of NAFTA provoked by Methanex, see generally Lucien 
J. Dhooge, The Revenge of the Trail Smelter:  Environmental Regulation as 
Expropriation Pursuant to the North American Free Trade Agreement, 38 Am. Bus. L. J. 
475 (2001), at 478-479, notes 18-25. 
79  Loewen Group, Inc. v. U.S.A., ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/98/3, Final Award 26 June 
2003 (Anthony Mason, Abner J. Mikva and Michael Mustill arbs.), 42 I.L.M. 811 (2003), 
available at www.nafftaclaims.com; Interim Award on Jurisdiction, 5 January 2001.  
Based on NAFTA Articles 1105 and 1110, the claim arose out of the $500 million verdict 
that included $400 million in punitive damages.  Appeal required a bond of 125% The 
rich tapestry of this dispute is set forth in Jonathan Harr, The Burial, The New Yorker, 1 
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jury had awarded half a billion dollars in favor of a Mississippi funeral director who 
claimed that a Canadian buyer had breached a contract for the purchase of his funeral 
parlors.  When the Canadian attempted to appeal, he found that state law required the 
posting of a bond as security for payment of the judgment equal to 125% of the amount 
awarded.  In this case the sum would have been $ 625 million, high enough to force a 
substantial settlement.   
 The Canadian company then filed a NAFTA Chapter 11 claim against the United 
States in an ICSID Additional Facility arbitration.  The investor claimed that there had 
been a denial of justice in a trial involving flagrant attempts to inflame jurors by casting 
the Canadian party as an outsider due to differences in race, nationality and class.  An 
interim award decided that a court judgment can be considered a governmental 
“measure” that might give rise to liability for discrimination, failure to grant “fair and 
equitable treatment” and expropriation without adequate compensation.  However, the 
final award denied compensation due to failure to exhaust local remedies, and a change 
of the Canadian claimant’s national identity following a bankruptcy reorganization as an 
American entity. 
3. Mondev   
 In the final example, a Quebec corporation commenced arbitration arising from a 
decision by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court dismissing an action against the 
city of Boston for breach of a contract to sell property in connection with municipal 
redevelopment, and against the Boston Redevelopment Authority for tortious interference 
                                                                                                                                                 
November 1999, at 70, describing the backgrounds of the Mississippi plaintiff, Jeremiah 
O’Keefe, his Florida lawyer, Willy Gary, the allegedly xenophobic comments to the jury, 
and the circumstances surrounding the $ 175 million settlement. 
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with contractual relations.80  The developers had entered into an agreement with Boston 
to acquire a parcel of downtown real estate.  When the city balked at going through with 
the transfer, the failure was ultimately excused on the basis that the Canadian investment 
vehicle did not  “follow the steps” required under the agreement, since its offer to buy the 
parcel had not manifested a “precise time and place for passing papers.”81  The claim 
against the Boston Redevelopment Authority  was dismissed on the basis that this public 
body was immune from tort liability under the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act.82  
 Aggrieved by the court decision, the Montreal investor brought a $50 million 
claim under the ICSID Additional Facility alleging discrimination, expropriation without 
compensation and denial of “fair and equitable treatment.”   The decision of the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court endorsing the denial of the developer’s right to 
purchase the land was described as “unprincipled” and “arbitrary.”83 
 One can understand that such a proceeding might surprise many Americans.  
Imagine, however, the reverse situation, in which rights of similarly situated Boston 
                                                 
80   Mondev International Ltd. v. United States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB 
(AF)/99/2; Award of 11 October 2002 published in 42 I.L.M. 85 (2003).  The arbitral 
tribunal dismissed Mondev’s claims, finding that the American court decisions “did not 
involve any violation of Article 1105(1) of NAFTA or otherwise.”  The party-nominated 
arbitrators were James Crawford (for Claimant) and Stephen Schwebel (for Respondent 
US), and the Presiding Arbitrator is Ninian Stephen.  See also Lafayette Place Associates 
v. Boston Redevelopment Authority, 427 Mass. 509, 694 N.E.2d 820 (1998).  Operating 
in Boston through the limited partnership, Mondev had agreed to participate in a project 
originating in an attempt to rehabilitate the so-called “combat zone,” a dilapidated area 
near Boston’s downtown shopping district.  Although the Supreme Judicial Court found 
the contract with Boston to be enforceable, the developers were deemed to have forfeited 
their rights due to lack of evidence that they were ready, able and willing to close the 
sale. 
81  Id. at 520. 
82  Id. at 531-533.  See MGL, c. 258, §§ 1, 10(c). 
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investors are rebuffed by a foreign court.  It is not hard to imagine New England voices 
crying foul play.84 
B. Reactions and Complaints 
 As the first Chapter 11 cases were filed against the United States and Canada,85 
voices began to be heard saying that investment arbitration infringes national 
prerogatives. Investor protection has been presented by activists as a subterfuge to 
challenge laws simply because they have a negative impact on the foreign capitalist.86  In 
one New York Times article NAFTA arbitration was thus described, “Their meetings are 
secret.  Their members are generally unknown. The decisions they reach need not be fully 
disclosed. Yet the way a small group of international tribunals handles disputes between 
                                                                                                                                                 
83  Mondev International Ltd. v. USA, Notice of Arbitration, 1 September 1999, at 
page 74.  ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2.   
84  The story in the Boston newspapers might read something like this:  “Xenophobic 
judge in Ruritania refused to enforce a promise to sell property to an American company.  
Investor asks why it should take the trouble of entering into contracts when local 
judiciary excuses breach of agreement on a technicality, citing nothing more than absence 
of a ‘precise time and place for passing papers.’ The seller was granted total immunity 
from liability.” 
85 Thus far twenty-seven notices of intent (not all of which have been followed by claims) 
have been brought under Chapter 11: nine against Canada (Ethyl, S.D. Myers, Sun Belt, 
Pope & Talbot, UPS, Ketcham Investments, Crompton, Trammel Crow and Signa); ten 
against Mexico (Metalclad, Karpa (a.k.a. Feldman), Adams, Azinian, Waste Management 
Services I and II, Calmark Commercial Development, Halchette, GAMI Investments Inc. 
and Fireman’s Fund); eight against the United States (Loewen, Methanex, Mondev, ADF 
Group, Canfor, Tembec, Kenex and Doman). Cases raising environment issues include 
Metalclad, Methanex, Ethyl, S.D. Myers and Crompton. 
86 See generally, Charles N. Brower & Lee A. Steven, Who Then Should Judge?: 
Developing the International Rule of Law under NAFTA Chapter 11, 2 Chi. J. Int’l. L. 
193, 198 (2001); Daniel M. Price, Some Observations on Chapter Eleven of NAFTA, 23 
Hastings Int’l. & Comp. L. Rev. 421 (2000); Frederick M. Abbott, The Political 
Economy of NAFTA Chapter Eleven: Equality Before the Law and the Boundaries of 
North American Integration, 23 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 303, 306 (2000). 
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investors and foreign governments has led to national laws being revoked, justice systems 
questioned and environmental regulations challenged.”87 
 Among the most negative reactions to investment arbitration, a December 2001 
advertisement in the Washington Post attacked investment arbitration under the headline 
“Fast Track Attack on America’s Values,” which appeared against the background of the 
preamble to the US Constitution (“We the people...”) with captions that read: “Secret 
Courts for Corporations” and “Taxpayer Dollars for Foreign Polluters.”88 
The full-page advertisement urged rejection of the trade bill (ultimately passed by one 
vote in the House of Representatives) giving the President “fast track” authority to 
negotiate agreements in the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).  These agreements 
could extend to thirty-four Western Hemisphere countries based on the NAFTA model.  
 In one well-publicized television show hosted by Bill Moyers, NAFTA was 
labeled a “sophisticated extortion racket,” and “an end-run around the Constitution” in 
                                                 
87 See, e.g., Anthony De Palma, NAFTA’s Powerful Little Secret, New York Times, 
Sunday Late Edition, 11 March 2001, Section 3, at 1. For an attempt at a more broad-
based rebuttal of claims that international trade undermines governmental regulatory 
structures, see Ronald A Cass and John R. Haring, Domestic Regulation and 
International Trade:  Where's the Race? -- Lessons from Telecommunications and Export 
Controls, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW:  ESSAYS IN 
HONOR OF ROBERT E. HUDEC 111 (Daniel L.M. Kennedy & James D. Southwick eds., 
Cambridge University Press 2002); also published in 11 JOURNAL DES ÉCONOMISTES ET 
DES ÉTUDES HUMAINES 531 (2001). 
88  Sponsored by Ralph Nader’s “Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch,” the publication 
referred to possible extension of a NAFTA provision permitting “foreign corporations to 
sue the federal government in secret tribunals, demanding our tax dollars as payment for 
complying with U.S. health, safety and pollution laws.”  The advertisement continued 
that foreign manufacturers of toxic chemicals could use “private courts” (i.e., arbitration) 
“to sue U.S. taxpayers . . . if zoning rules kept them from building a chemical plant near a 
school.”  Referring to arbitration’s confidentiality, the advertisement said that “even the 
identity of judges can be kept secret indefinitely,” ending with the rhetorical question, 
“Whose side is Congress on--foreign corporations or the American people?”  See 
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which “secret NAFTA tribunals can force taxpayers to pay billions of dollars in 
lawsuits.”89   
 Environmentalists have been particularly vocal in saying that NAFTA makes it 
possible to undermine legitimate governmental regulations.90  Chapter 11 arbitration is 
portrayed as a forum insulated from rightful domestic political and legal safeguards.91  
The World Wildlife Fund and the Institute for Sustainable Development published a 
report entitled Private Rights, Public Problems which labels NAFTA Chapter 11 
arbitration as “one-sided” and “lacking transparency,” and concludes that arbitration is 
“shockingly unsuited to the task of balancing private rights against public goods.”92 
                                                                                                                                                 
Washington Post, 5 December 2001, at A-5, placed by the Global Trade Watch division 
of Public Citizen (www.citizen.org). 
89  The transcript of the PBS special series “Trading Democracy,” which aired on 
1 February 2002, can be obtained on www.pbs.org/now/transcript. 
90 No administrative veto prohibits arbitration of disputes implicating environmental 
measures.  NAFTA simply provides that nothing in Chapter 11 shall be construed as 
preventing adoption of measures “to ensure that investment activity … is undertaken in a 
manner sensitive to environmental concerns.”  See NAFTA Article 1114. 
91  See, e.g., comments at “Public Citizen” web page (www.citizen.org). See also Howard 
Mann and Konrad von Moltke, NAFTA’s Chapter 11 and the Environment: Addressing 
the Impacts of the Investor-State Process on the Environment, International Institute for 
Sustainable Development Working Paper (1999) (http://iisd1.iisd.ca/pdf/nafta.pdf). 
Complaints include the “virtually unfettered right of foreign investors to initiate direct 
actions against their host governments” and the “aggressive use of this process to 
challenge public policy and public welfare measures.”  The authors complain about 
“uncertainty and unpredictability for environmental regulations,” lack of procedural or 
public interest safeguards, “non-transparent, secretive and non-appealable” arbitration, all 
of which mean that host governments must “pay foreign investors in order to be able to 
effectively regulate the environment.” See also Todd Weiler, A First Look at the Interim 
Merits Award in S.D. Myers v. Canada: It Is Possible to Balance Legitimate 
Environmental Concerns with Investment Protection, 24 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 
173 (2001); Joseph de Pencier, Investment, Environment and Dispute Settlement: 
Arbitration Under NAFTA Chapter Eleven, 23 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 409 
(2000). 
92 Howard Mann, Private Rights, Public Goods (International Institute for Sustainable 
Development and World Wildlife Fund, 2001), at 46.  The report by Dr. Mann, a lawyer 
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 Members of Congress also complain that NAFTA tribunals override health and 
labor laws, and express alarm that the United States federal government might be held 
liable for the idiosyncratic acts of local authorities and state courts.93 During debate on an 
appropriations bill, a Congressman lamented that the Justice Department might have to 
sue local governments to enforce NAFTA decisions, and in a burst of fervor proclaimed, 
“This is nuts! ... We must stand together to protect the sovereignty of American laws.”94 
 A recent indication of American discontent with the NAFTA model for 
investment dispute resolution came in response to legislative efforts to extend trade 
benefits to Latin American countries. The Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee 
                                                                                                                                                 
based in Ottawa, led to follow-up commentary in Canada and the United States that 
furthered the negative characterization of NAFTA.  See Mark Thomsen, Companies 
Using NAFTA to Undermine Legitimate Regulations, 12 June 2001, reported at 
www.socialfunds.com/news; Chantal Blouin, NAFTA Goes Too Far on Investor 
Protection, North-South Institute, 31 August 2001, reported at www.nsi-ins.ca/ensi/news. 
93  See debate on HR 2670, an appropriations bill for the Commerce, Justice and State 
Departments, at 145 Cong. Rec., HR, 106th Congress, 1st Session, 5 August 1999, at H-
7368.  Federal statute prohibits challenge of state laws inconsistent with NAFTA, “except 
in an action brought by the United States [i.e., the federal government] for the purposes 
of declaring such law or application invalid.”  19 U.S.C. § 3312(b)(2), codifying § 102(b) 
of NAFTA Implementation Act.  Similar protections apply to state laws in conflict with 
Uruguay Round trade agreements.  19 U.S.C. § 3512(b)(2).  An amendment to the bill 
offered by Rep. Kucinich (Ohio) would have prohibited the Department of Justice from 
using appropriated funds to challenge state laws that run afoul of NAFTA, for example 
the Mississippi bond requirement in Loewen.  The amendment failed 196 to 226.  
94 145 Cong. Rec., HR, 106th Congress, 1st Session, 5 August 1999, at H-7368.  
Congressman Tierney (Massachusetts) expressed concern that the pace of globalization 
might result in “sacrificing state and local laws at the altar of ill-defined international 
investor rights.” Congressman Shows (Mississippi) opposed allowing “American 
taxpayer dollars [to] pay American lawyers to help a foreign corporation fight American 
state laws in court.”   Id. Congressman Bonior (Michigan) added, “The question ... is very 
clear: Should the rights of an investor come before the rights to enact a chemical ban to 
prevent cancer?”  Id. Observers will note, of course, that NAFTA prohibits 
discrimination, not the right to ban carcinogens.  The essence of the concern would seem 
to be that arbitrators hearing anti-discrimination claims might strike down otherwise valid 
health regulations.   
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wrote to the Bush Administration endorsing attempts to deny foreign investors any 
substantive rights not given to American investors, to establish an appellate review of 
NAFTA awards,95 and to support government screening of arbitration requests to reduce 
the prospect that they are ever considered by arbitrators.96   
 While not all legislators accepted the wisdom of such measures,97 some went 
even further.  Senator Kerry of Massachusetts proposed amendments to the Andean 
Trade Preferences Act which would have given the investor state98 the right to prohibit 
arbitration on the basis that the claim “lacks legal merit” and established a “single 
appellate body” to review decisions in investment arbitration.99  
                                                 
95  Letter of 26 March 2002 from Max Baucus to Trade Representative Robert Zoellick, 
discussed in Rossella Brevetti, Baucus Welcomes Options Administration Is Considering 
on Investor-State Disputes, BNA Int'l Trade, Vol. 19, No. 13 at 529 (28 March 2002).   
96  A similar screening mechanism already exists with respect to expropriation claims that 
implicate tax measures. See NAFTA Article 2103(6), discussed infra.   
97  On 28 March 2002 the Senate Finance Committee’s ranking Republican Charles 
Grassley urged Trade Representative Zoellick to reject such screening.  See Rosella 
Brevetti, Grassley Urges Zoellick to Reject Government Screening for Investor Suits, 
Regulation Law & Economics, No. 62, 1 April 2002, at A-6.  Industry groups, including 
the National Association of Manufacturers, have also expressed concern for the 
preservation of investor protections for American-owned businesses abroad.  See 
Brevetti, 26 March 2002, supra. See also discussion of HR 3005 in Chris Rugaber and 
Rossella Brevetti, In Partisan Markup, House Ways and Means Approves TPA 
Legislation, International Trade Reporter Current Reports, 11 October 2001. 
98  While some might imagine that this veto right would be given to the host state, in fact 
the Kerry proposals accorded this to the “competent authority in the investor’s country.” 
See SA 3430, proposed Section 2102(b)(3)(H)(i) & (ii).  This approach follows the lines 
of traditional practice in matters of state responsibility, with a capital exporting country 
espousing its national’s claim in order to assert protection of the investor’s foreign assets. 
99 The Kerry proposals would also have modified the substantive contours of what 
NAFTA arbitrators could award, requiring inter alia that trade agreements with 
investment provisions (i)  ensure that foreign investors receive no greater legal rights than 
American citizens; (ii) exclude compensation for regulatory measures that cause “mere 
diminution” in the value of property; and (iii) ensure that standards for minimum 
treatment grant foreigners no greater legal rights than possessed by American citizens 
under the Constitution’s due process clause.  See Kerry amendment to Andean Trade 
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 As finally enacted, last year’s trade legislation includes several provisions 
designed to restrict the type of arbitration provisions normally found in investment 
treaties.  After a self-congratulatory preamble to the effect that the United States 
“provides a high level of protection for investment”, the Trade Act of 2002 defines 
American trade negotiating objectives to include making sure that foreign investors 
receive no “greater substantive rights with respect to investment protections” than 
domestic investors – thus echoing objections to investment arbitration long propounded 
by developing countries.  The Act sets forth the means to this end, including an 
improvement of investor/host state dispute resolution through “mechanisms to eliminate 
frivolous claims,” and “an appellate body … to “provide coherence to interpretations of 
investment provisions in trade agreements” as well as a mandate to make public all 
investment arbitration proceedings and to allow amicus curiae submissions from 
business, labor and non-governmental organizations.100 
 Some groups in Canada have likewise complained bitterly about NAFTA, 
alleging that it serves “to limit the legitimate rights of governments to regulate.”101  An 
                                                                                                                                                 
Preference Expansion Act, H. R. 3009 (107th Cong. 2nd Sess.), Senate Amendment 3430 
to Section 2102(b) of the Andean Trade Preferences Act,  Cong. Rec. 16 May 2002 S 
4504.  The amendment was tabled 21 May 2002 
100  See Section 2102(b)(3) of Trade Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-210), 16 Stat. 933, codified 
19 U.S.C. 3802. 
101 See Nihal Sherif, Canadian Memo Identifies Options for Changing NAFTA 
Investment Rules, Inside US Trade at 20 (12 February 1999) (commenting upon a memo 
of the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade).  See also 
discussion of Pope & Talbot v. Canada, Award of 26 June 2000 (discussed 16 Int’l Arb. 
Rep. 20, July 2001), finding that Canadian export controls on softwood lumber 
discriminated against an Oregon investor; final award 31 May 2002. See also Todd 
Weiler, A First Look at the Interim Merits Award in S.D. Myers v. Canada: It Is Possible 
to Balance Legitimate Environmental Concerns with Investment Protection, 24 Hastings 
Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 173 (2001); Joseph de Pencier, Investment, Environment and 
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editorial in the Toronto Globe and Mail criticized the confidentiality inherent in 
arbitration as a “cone of silence,” claiming that “lawsuits against the Canadian 
government under NAFTA’s Chapter 11 end up being composed almost entirely of rumor 
and leaks rather than official documents.”102 
C. Understandable Concerns 
 Many host state concerns about NAFTA arbitration are understandable.  
Considerable ambiguity exists with respect to what constitutes “fair and equitable” 
treatment.  The law on expropriation is also relatively malleable, with little consensus on 
the standards that determine when administrative regulations give rise to a governmental 
taking that requires compensation.  Must a claimant show an abuse of power by the host 
government?  Must the nationalization include an element of bad faith?  May a foreign 
investor recover in circumstances where the claim of a domestic owner would fail?   
 The crux of the problem is that not all discrimination is outright and abrupt.  
Arbitrary taking of property may occur in a gradual fashion through abusive manipulation 
of the legal system.  Various names have been applied to such de facto nationalization: 
“creeping expropriation,” “indirect expropriation,” and “constructive expropriation,” as 
                                                                                                                                                 
Dispute Settlement: Arbitration Under NAFTA Chapter Eleven, 23 Hastings Int’l & 
Comp. L. Rev. 409 (2000). 
102  NAFTA Cone of Silence, Toronto Globe and Mail, 26 August 1998, at A-14.  
Responses to this editorial include letters to the editor by Sergio Marchi (Canadian Trade 
Minister), who asserted that investor rights must not “inhibit the sovereign responsibility 
of governments to legislate and regulate in the public interest” (Globe and Mail, 
31 August 1998, at A-12) and Maude Barlow, who asserted that NAFTA was the “first 
international treaty in history to grant foreign investors the right to bypass their own 
governments in a trade dispute and sue the government of another country for cash 
compensation” and that NAFTA arbitrators were all “trade bureaucrats.” (Globe and 
Mail, 5 September 1998, at D-7). 
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well as measures “tantamount to” or “equivalent to” expropriation.103  Indirect 
nationalization through improper administrative measures has long served as a back door 
to deprive the investor of its assets.104  In some cases a taking might occur through non-
action, as when a state refuses to interfere with popular seizure of foreign property or 
fails to fulfill a contractual obligation to grant fiscal benefits. 
 Expropriation under the guise of otherwise valid regulations is often easier to 
recognize than to define, as illustrated by the practice of the Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation (OPIC).105  A federally chartered agency of the United States government, 
OPIC insures American investors against expropriation and currency inconvertibility in 
connection with their foreign investments.106  Notwithstanding OPIC’s broad definition 
of expropriation,107 the experience of investors seeking reimbursement has not always 
                                                 
103 See generally Burns H. Weston, Constructive Takings under International Law:  A 
Modest Foray into the Problem of “Creeping Expropriation,” 16  Va. J. Int’l L. 103 
(1975); Rosalyn Higgins, The Taking of Property by the State: Recent Developments in 
International Law, 176 Recueil des Cours (Hague 1982), at 259; Rudolf Dolzer, Indirect 
Expropriation of Alien Property, 1 ICSID Rev./FILJ 41 (1986).  See also discussion of 
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) infra.  See generally, Markham Ball, 
Assessing Damages in Claims by Investors Against States, 16 ICSID REVIEW/FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT LAW J. 408 (2001). 
104 See, e.g., Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belgium v. Spain) (2d 
Phase), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 9 I.L.M. 227 (1970).  By refusal to authorize transfer of foreign 
currency to pay Sterling bond interest, Spain allegedly engineered the bankruptcy of a 
Canadian owned company as a way to deprive the parent of its property.  See also V.V. 
Veeder, The Lena Goldfields Arbitration: The Historical Roots of Three Ideas, 47 Int’l & 
Comp. L. Q. 747 (1998) (discussion of Goldfields v. USSR, Judgment of 3 September 
1930). 
105 See generally Vance Koven, Expropriation and the “Jurisprudence” of OPIC, 
22 Harvard Int’l L. J. 269 (1981); Wolfgang Peter, Arbitration and Renegotiation of 
International Investment Agreements (2d ed. 1995), at 348-357. 
106 The Contract of Insurance provides for controversies between OPIC and the investor 
to be settled by arbitration.  
107  OPIC’s current Program Handbook (available at www.opic.gov) defines 
expropriation coverage as protection against “nationalization, confiscation or 
 38 
been consistent.108  In many instances jurists will find difficulty establishing intellectually 
rigorous standards, and thus will be consigned to a “we-know-it-when-we-see-it” attitude 
toward de facto takings. 
 Not all scholars see the case law of expropriation as a threat to environmental 
regulations.  One thoughtful study of regulatory takings has identified a number of 
standards applied in nationalization cases, such as proportionality, necessity and non-
discrimination.109  Not every governmental measure that diminishes the worth of an 
investment will require compensation, and some balance must be struck between the right 
to regulate and the preservation of property values. At the least, the investor has the right 
to be concerned with uncertainty and surprise and breaches of prior commitments.110 
                                                                                                                                                 
expropriation of an enterprise, including “creeping” expropriation – unlawful government 
actions that deprive the investor of fundamental rights in a project” but excluding losses 
due to “lawful regulation or taxation” and “actions provoked or instigated by the 
investor.”  Id. at 11.  See also www.opic.gov/finance/products/expropriation.htm; 
Jonathan Haddon, PLI Presentation February 1999, 784 PLI/Comm 271. 
108  In one case OPIC acknowledged that rights could be denied through a “chain of 
conduct,” but found that the investor’s control over its assets continued even after it lost 
managerial and shareholder control of the investment vehicle.  See Cabot Int’l Capital 
Corp., Contract 8383, Memorandum of Determination (27 December 1980).  See also 
Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. OPIC, American Arbitration Association Award 
reprinted in 17 Int’l Legal Mats. 1321 (1978), motion to vacate denied, D.C. Cir. (26 
February 1980), cert. denied, 100 S.Ct. 2964 (1980).  At that time the OPIC Contract of 
Insurance defines “expropriatory action” to include actions that prevent (a) payment of 
amounts due in respect of securities, (b) effective exercise of fundamental rights, (c) 
disposition of securities, (d) exercise of effective control or (e) repatriation of earnings. 
109  See Thomas Waelde & Abba Kolo, Environmental Regulation, Investment Protection 
and ‘Regulatory Taking’ in International Law, 50 Int’l & Comp. L. Q. 811 (2001). 
110  Waelde and Kolo conclude, “[I]t is unlikely that courts or arbitrators will find a 
compensable expropriation in cases where governments issue environmental regulation 
for legitimate purposes in accordance with the state of scientific knowledge and accepted 
international guidelines.”  Id. at 846.  The authors remain optimistic that regulatory 
taking would be found “only when the environment becomes a pretext for domestic 
protectionism and when elements of discrimination or breach of governmental 
 39 
 To some extent the United States may have become a victim of its own success.  
In the past, Americans sometimes persuaded arbitrators to adopt broad standards 
providing “protection and security” that might override otherwise legitimate domestic 
laws.111  Regulations which in a domestic context constituted normal protection of the 
public interest appeared in a cross-border transaction as violations of international law.  
Thus Americans were, in Shakespeare’s words, “hoist with their own petard,”112 having 
contributed to the creation of pro-investor substantive standards applied by international 
tribunals, and to a blurring of distinctions between state-private proceedings (“mixed 
arbitration”) and commercial arbitration exclusively among private parties.113 
D. Limiting the Scope of Investment Arbitration 
1. Compromises to Reconcile Competing Goals 
 NAFTA’s drafters recognized that they were combining a trade agreement with 
an investment treaty, and that arbitration of investment disputes might have a disruptive 
effect on other NAFTA commitments including trade in goods and procurement.  
                                                                                                                                                 
commitments or [when regulation has been used] to extract benefits unrelated to the 
legitimate purpose of the regulation....”  Id.  
111  See, e.g., American Mfg. & Trading (AMT). v. Zaire, 36 I.L.M. 1531 (1997), arising 
under the US-Zaire 1984 Bilateral Investment Treaty and involving damage to property 
of an American subsidiary by the Zaire army.  Referring to the host state’s “obligation of 
vigilance” to “ensure the full enjoyment of protection and security of [the US company’s] 
investment,” the arbitral tribunal stated that Zaire “should not be permitted to invoke its 
own legislation to detract from any such obligation.”  Id. at 1548.  The case is cited in 
Methanex Amended Claim (12 February 2001) at 65.   
112  See Hamlet, Act III, Scene 4 (“for ‘tis sport to have the engineer hoist with his own 
petard”), in which the Prince of Denmark makes plans to catch the conspirators in his 
father’s murder.  
113  For a comparison of stricter and more flexible approaches to long-term cross-border 
contracts, see Nagla Nassar, Security of Contracts Revisited (1995). 
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Moreover, there was recognition that investment arbitration posed special problems with 
respect to vital national prerogatives in tax and financial services.   
 Multiple compromises were made to reconcile NAFTA’s competing goals.  For 
example, inconsistencies between Chapter 11 and other NAFTA chapters are resolved in 
favor of the latter,114 and investment is limited by a definition numerus clausus indicating 
what “investment means” rather than what “investment includes.”115   Excluded from the 
definition of investment are loans to state enterprises and money claims arising solely 
from contracts for the sale of goods or services or the extension of commercial credit.116   
The creation of intellectual property rights will generally not give rise to rights to claim 
compensation for expropriation,117 and non-discriminatory measures of general 
application will not be considered tantamount to expropriation of a loan or debt security 
merely because they impose an increased cost that causes debtor default.118  
 Of particular interest are the limitations on investment arbitration that implicate 
tax and finance, two areas of particular sensitivity to economic sovereignty.  As discussed 
below, member states have the right in certain circumstances to block or to modify 
Chapter 11 arbitration in both of these domains. 
2. Expropriation Through Fiscal Measures 
a) Distinguishing Abusive Taxation 
                                                 
114 Article 1112. 
115 Article 1138. 
116  Article 11389. 
117  Article 1110 does not apply to the creation or limitation of intellectual property rights 
to the extent consistent with Chapter XVII, which addresses intellectual property 
explicitly. 
118  Article 1110(8). 
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Few areas illustrate the complex interaction of arbitration and sovereignty 
concerns more sharply than taxation.  The power to raise revenue by forced levies is an 
attribute of sovereignty that is less negotiable than others.119  Yet uncompensated 
nationalization often takes the form of excessive fiscal measures, designed either to force 
the foreign owner to abandon the investment by taxing away its economic value, or to 
subject an investor’s competitors to a more favorable tax regime.  While escaping precise 
definition, such subtler forms of expropriation can deprive an investor of wealth 
arbitrarily as effectively as explicit nationalization. 
Evaluating such “creeping expropriation” does not lend itself to facile analysis.  
Distinctions must be made between normal and excessive taxation, a task that implicates 
culturally influenced notions of the “right” level of tax.120  From one perspective taxation 
constitutes a form of asset seizure (echoed in the American catch phrase “the power to 
tax is the power to destroy”121) in which fiscal authorities take money from its current 
owner (the taxpayer) and give it to someone else (the state).   
 The competing characterizations of tax may be distinctions without a difference, 
however.  Fiscal measures inevitably involve an element of expropriation.  The only 
                                                 
119 One remembers that it was a tax revolt that forced King John of England to sign the 
Magna Charta in 1215.  And few scholars challenge Lord Mansfield’s “Revenue Rule” 
preventing enforcement of foreign tax judgments.  See Holman v. Johnson, 98 Engl. Rep. 
1120 (K.B. 1775). For later articulations of this principle, see HM Queen v. Gilbertson, 
597 F.2d 1161 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Boots, 80 F.3d 580 (1st Cir. 1996).  
120  Justice Holmes distinguished between a penalty intended as a “discouragement” to 
behavior and a tax that “may be part of an encouragement [to actions] when seen in its 
organic connection with the whole.”  Compañía General de Tabaco de Filipinas v. 
Collector of Internal Revenue, 275 U.S. 87 (1927), at 100. 
121 The original US Supreme Court citation was: “An unlimited power to tax involves, 
necessarily, a power to destroy; because there is a limit beyond which no institution and 
no property can bear taxation.”  McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 327 
(1819), striking down a state tax on a federally chartered bank. 
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question is whether they are “normal” taxes or are the type of punitive measure intended 
to confiscate foreign investment.   
 The problematic nature of using arbitration to settle claims that taxation 
constitutes “creeping expropriation” was foreseen when NAFTA was drafted.  The 
Chapter 11 dispute resolution process would be misused and corrupted if “ordinary” 
fiscal measures gave rise to expropriation claims.  Consequently, the fiscal 
administrations of host and investor countries have been given the task of making a 
preliminary cut between normal and abnormal taxes. 
 If an alleged expropriation is accomplished through “taxation measures,” the 
competent fiscal authorities of the relevant states may veto the investor’s right to 
arbitrate.122  At the time of advising the host state of its intention to commence 
arbitration, the investor must also submit the tax measure to the appropriate fiscal 
authorities.  The investor may proceed to arbitration only if the competent authorities “do 
not agree to consider the issue or, having agreed to consider it, fail to agree that the 
measure is not an expropriation.”123 
                                                 
122  NAFTA Article 2103(6) states that Article 1110 provisions concerning expropriation 
“shall apply to taxation measures except that no investor may invoke that Article as the 
basis for a claim [for investment dispute resolution], where it has been determined 
pursuant to this paragraph that the measure is not an expropriation.”  Thus far, at least 
one case (the Karpa claim against Mexico) implicated tax measures.  The competent 
authorities agreed that one of the three measures was not an expropriation, and thus the 
arbitration did not go forward on that question.  As to two other measures, however, there 
was no agreement, and thus for those issues the arbitration proceeded. 
123  It is uncertain whether an investor’s disregard of reference to the competent 
authorities (either in bad faith or due to an innocent misunderstanding) would provide an 
opportunity for sua sponte intervention by tax authorities.  Whether or not permitted, 
state intervention would not seem mandated.  Rather, without an opinion from the 
relevant fiscal authorities, an expropriation claim would lie beyond the arbitrators’ 
jurisdiction.   
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 This awkwardly drafted “negative deadlock” provision gives the competent 
authorities six months to decide the question, failing which the investor may proceed to 
arbitration.124  In attempting to distinguish normal from excessive taxation, fiscal 
authorities inevitably can be expected to rely on culturally influenced notions of tax.125 
NAFTA does not suggest that tax matters cannot be arbitrated.  Rather, the treaty 
says that fiscal authorities in host and investor states together may block the arbitral 
proceedings by agreeing “that the [tax] measure is not an expropriation.”126  Thus if the 
United States is accused of expropriating a Canadian investor’s property, investment 
arbitration would be barred only if both the US Department of the Treasury and the 
Canadian Department of Finance concluded that no expropriation had taken place.127   
                                                 
124  The English language version contains a slight ambiguity, providing for arbitration to 
go forward “[i]f the competent authorities do not agree to consider the issue or, having 
agreed to consider it, fail to agree that the measure is not an expropriation within a period 
of six months of such referral [by the investor].”  To interpret the six month limit as 
applying only to competent authorities who agreed to hear the matter (as contrasted to 
ignoring or refusing to consider the investor’s request), would make little sense in this 
context. 
125 For example, Americans can be expected to look to the U.S. tax system, based on the 
same approach used to characterize “income tax” for purposes of the foreign tax credit.  
See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 901-2(a); Bank of America Nat’l Trust & Savings Ass’n v. United 
States, 459 F.2d 513, 515 (Ct. Cl. 1972) (“It is now settled that the question of whether a 
foreign tax is an ‘income tax’ ...  must be decided under criteria established by our 
revenue laws and court decisions, and that the foreign tax must be the substantial 
equivalent of an income tax as the term is understood in the United States”). 
126  The text of NAFTA, Article 2103(6) does not make clear whether a “tax veto” 
requires unanimity of all three competent authorities, or only from the tax administrations 
of the investor and host state.  In practice only the latter two administrations would be 
directly concerned, although the third country might argue for inclusion on the theory that 
such decisions have policy implications affecting all NAFTA members.  
127 See NAFTA Annex 2103(6).  The competent authority for the United States would be 
the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury (Tax Policy), for Canada it would be the Assistant 
Deputy Minister for Tax Policy, and for Mexico it would be the Deputy Minister of 
Revenue of the Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público (Ministry of Finance and Public 
Credit).  
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Presumably the Canadian authorities would hesitate to acquiesce in the plundering of its 
citizens merely because such theft was dressed in fiscal garb. Thus the capital exporter’s 
government is given a protective role, in that refusal to join the veto authorizes 
arbitration. 
The tax veto by its terms applies only to claims of improper expropriation under 
NAFTA Article 1110.  By contrast, claims for breaches of other host state duties, such as 
“fair and equitable treatment”, might possibly escape the jurisdiction of the respective 
national fiscal authorities.  
b) Impact of NAFTA Concerns on Tax Treaty Arbitration 
 Before moving on, it is worth noting that the perception of arbitration as an 
abdication of sovereignty will likely affect attempts to eliminate another barrier to cross-
border investment arbitration:  asymmetrical transfer pricing adjustments by national tax 
authorities.  When two countries disagree on how to interpret an income tax treaty, the 
task of resolving the difference falls either to national court actions or to joint efforts by 
the tax administrations to work out differences on a voluntary basis.  Neither alternative 
is satisfactory.  Judicial proceedings lack political neutrality and yield inconsistent 
results.  And the process for “mutual agreement” among competent fiscal authorities is 
fraught with delays and uncertainty.   
 The problem is particularly acute when the tax treatment of a company in one 
country (in the form of deductions, for example) does not accord with that of an affiliate 
in the other (where items of income might be included).  The lack of fiscal symmetry 
creates an economic double taxation that distorts cross-border capital flows.  
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 In response, scholars and non-governmental organizations have suggested 
arbitration as a means to address income tax treaty disputes.128  To date, however, income 
tax treaty arbitration remains more aspiration than reality.129  While some treaties include 
language raising the prospect of arbitration, these provisions operate only if the two 
countries agree after a controversy arises.  Such provisions have never been implemented, 
due to the contracting states’ inability to reach accord when a dispute actually occurs.  
Only the new Austro-German treaty imposes a duty to arbitrate treaty differences without 
further negotiation. 
 To remedy this, the International Chamber of Commerce130 and the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development have issued policy papers suggesting 
arbitration to resolve inconsistency tax treaty application. 131  The International Fiscal 
                                                 
128  See, e.g., William W. Park, Income Tax Treaty Arbitration, 31 TAX MANAGEMENT 
INT’L J. 219 (May 2002); GUSTAF LINDENCRONA & NILS MATTSON, ARBITRATION IN 
TAXATION (1981); Jean-Marie Henckaerts, EC Arbitration Convention for Transfer 
Pricing Disputes, 10 J INT’ ARB. 111 (Sept 1993); Paul R. McDaniel, NAFTA and 
Formulary Apportionment, in Alpert and van Raad supra, at 293 (cited in this note); 
William W. Park, Finality and Fairness in Tax Arbitration, 11 J INT’L ARB. 19 (June 
1994). 
129 One practitioner has remarked a bit whimsically that ever since 1981, tax arbitration is 
“an idea whose time is about to come.”  David R. Tillinghast, Choice of Issues to be 
Submitted to Arbitration Under Income Tax Conventions, in ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL 
TAXATION 349 (H. Alpert and K. van Raad, eds, 1993). 
130  ICC Commission on Taxation, Arbitration in International Tax Matters, Doc. No. 
180/438 (3 May 2000) 
(www.iccwbo.org/home/statements_rules/statements/2000/arbitration_tax.asp);  ICC 
Commerce Commission on Taxation, Arbitration in International Tax Matters, Draft 
Bilateral Convention Article, Doc. No. 180/455 Rev. (10 September 2001). 
131   In 1995 the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
issued a confidential study on the topic, whose conclusions are being reconsidered as this 
paper is drafted.  Although its contents have not been made public, the paper has been the 
object of considerable informal discussion among international tax lawyers.  See OECD, 
Committee on Fiscal Affairs, The Role of Arbitration Procedures in Resolving Tax 
Disputes (11 January 1995), DAFFE/CFA (95) 12.   
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Association (IFA) has sponsored a study on the topic.132  Discussion of the topic has been 
organized by both the Tax Council Policy Institute133 and the American Society of 
International Law.134   
 Objections to these sensible suggestions include the alleged infringement of 
sovereignty constituted by arbitration, with much of the argument echoing a less 
sophisticated version of the complaints voiced about NAFTA Chapter 11.  However, as 
Rudyard Kipling might write, this is another story for another day. 
3. Financial Services 
 NAFTA provisions on financial services generally trump inconsistent stipulations 
in Chapter 11. 135  Under Chapter 14, the host state can invoke prudential concerns related 
to protection of depositors, financial markets and the maintenance of safe and sound 
financial institutions.136  On request of a member state, arbitrators must refer the matter to 
the  NAFTA Financial Services Committee (“Committee”) for a decision on whether the 
                                                 
132 See also International Fiscal Association, Resolution of Tax Treaty Conflicts by 
Arbitration, 18e IFA Congress Seminar Series (Kluwer 1993). 
133  Proceedings of Conference held 8 February 2002, forthcoming in George Mason Law 
Review, Volume 10, No. 4.  
134  American Society of International Law, 97th Annual Meeting, 3 April 2003, 
Washington, D.C., Arbitration of Disputes Under Income Tax Treaties (H.J. Ault, D.R. 
Tillinghast & W.W. Park). 
135  Article 1101(3) provides that Chapter 11 “does not apply to measures adopted or 
maintained by a [NAFTA country] to the extent that they are covered by Chapter 
Fourteen (Financial Services).”  Under Article 1401, the “minimum standard of 
treatment” provisions (Article 1105) do not apply to investment in financial services.   
136  Pursuant to Article 1410, none of the investment protections prevent a NAFTA Party 
from adopting reasonable measures for prudential reasons such as “protection of 
investors, depositors … financial market participants, … the maintenance of the safety 
[and] soundness … of financial institutions, and ensuring the integrity and stability of a 
[country’s] financial system,” nor from taking non-discriminatory measure of general 
application in pursuit of monetary and credit or exchange rate policies. 
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prudential concerns are valid defenses to an investor’s claim, which decision is binding 
on the tribunal.137   
 If the Committee makes no decision within sixty days, the host state or the 
investor’s country may request establishment of an arbitral panel convened under 
NAFTA’s institutional (state-to-state) dispute resolution provisions.138  The panel’s 
report, like the Committee’s decision, binds the arbitrators.  If no request for such dispute 
resolution has been made within ten days of the expiration of the sixty days for panel 
action, the arbitral tribunal may proceed to adjudicate the claim.  
IV. Old Problems, New Perspectives 
A. International Commercial Decision-making  
 Most of the current questions about investment arbitration did not originate with 
NAFTA.  Rather, the perceived novelty of the rhetoric derives from a change in the angle 
from which arbitration is observed.  Misgivings are new only in that Canada and the 
United States now articulate variations on themes long advanced by Latin American and 
African countries forced to arbitrate disputes over natural resources, the environment and 
other vital elements of national life.  Changing hats from a capital exporter’s fedora to a 
                                                 
137  See NAFTA Article 1415(2).  The term “Committee” is defined in annex 2001.2(A). 
The term “Tribunal” carries over the Chapter 11 taxonomy for the body of arbitrators 
deciding a particular dispute. 
138See NAFTA Article 1415(3) and 2008 et seq.  Such an arbitral panel is to be 
constituted in accordance with Article 1414 (see Article 1415(3)) , chosen from a special 
financial services roster to render a decision 
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host state’s sombrero, the United States has come to a new appreciation of the 
predicaments experienced by capital importers.139  
 The debate is essentially about control of the dispute resolution process:  not just 
what standards apply to matters such as expropriation, but who (courts or arbitrators) 
decides questions with a direct effect on the economic interests of both the investor and 
the host state.  The substantive norms governing expropriation and treatment of aliens 
remain basically unchanged, in that international law has long held states liable for injury 
to aliens.  The unique aspect of NAFTA lies in its creation of a private right of action by 
which foreign investors bypass the political hurdles to obtaining the diplomatic protection 
of their home country.   
 To some observers, NAFTA arbitral tribunals appear as courts of appeal on vital 
regulatory matters that discriminate against foreign investment or constitute illegal taking 
of an alien-owned property.  In fact, however, Chapter 11 tribunals have no such power, 
but may review only government measures that violate the NAFTA treaty obligations.140  
 Consequently, disquiet arises over the prospect that arbitrators may decide 
differently than would national judges.  In some instances this means that foreign 
claimants will receive better treatment than domestic courts give similarly situated local 
                                                 
139  See  M. SORNARAJAH, THE SETTLEMENT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES (2000); 
WOLFGANG PETER, ARBITRATION AND RENEGOTIATION OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
AGREEMENTS (2d ed. 1995).  
140  In a Chapter 11 arbitration brought by American investors against Mexico, the 
arbitral tribunal noted, “The possibility of holding a State internationally liable for 
judicial decisions does not, however, entitle a claimant to seek international review of the 
national court decisions as though the international jurisdiction seised has plenary 
jurisdiction. This is not true generally, and it is not true for NAFTA. What must be shown 
is that the court decision itself constitutes a violation of the treaty…..Claimants must 
show either a denial of justice, or a pretence of form to achieve an internationally 
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claimants.  Such differences should not be surprising.  Business managers have 
traditionally favored arbitration in overseas transactions precisely because an arbitrator 
may see things more dispassionately than a host state judge.  Moreover, investors from 
industrialized countries have long insisted on fair dealing for themselves, regardless of 
how poorly a host state might treat its own people.  
 Anti-NAFTA concerns rest in part on what has traditionally been considered a 
strong point of international arbitration: the general predisposition of those chosen to 
arbitrate international disputes.  Experienced commercial arbitrators generally will see 
their mandate as giving effect to the parties’ shared ex ante expectations, finding the facts 
and applying the law in the most dispassionate and correct fashion possible. Quite 
understandably, arbitrators do not normally see themselves as guardians of the public 
interest.141  In the context of NAFTA Chapter 11, these arbitral virtues may at some point 
be affected by the more public dimensions of the controverted investments. 
 Ironically, NAFTA Chapter 11 gives ingenious lawyers the opportunity to present 
on an international level the type of “due process” and “equal protection” arguments 
                                                                                                                                                 
unlawful end.”  Azinian v. United Mexican States (ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/2) 
Award on Merits of 1 November 1999, paragraph 99, page 29. 
141  This does not mean, however, that an arbitrator can ignore mandatory public norms 
(lois de police) imposed by the place of contract performance. See Pierre Mayer, 
Mandatory Rules of Law in International Arbitration, 2 Arb. Int'l 274 (1986); Pierre 
Mayer, Les Lois de Police Etrangères, 1981 J. Dr. Int'l 277; Pierre Mayer, Reflections on 
the International Arbitrator’s Duty to Apply the Law, 17 Arb. Int’l 235 (2001) (noting 
that “the relationship linking an arbitrator to the law is much more complex than the 
relationship that ties judges to it”).  See generally Abul F.M. Maniruzzaman, 
International Arbitrator and Mandatory Public Law Rules in the Context of State 
Contracts: An Overview, 7 J. Int’l Arb. 53 (September 1999); Abul F.M. Maniruzzaman, 
Internationalization of Foreign Investment Agreements, 1 J. World Investment 293 
(December 2000); Abul F.M. Maniruzzaman, The Lex Mercatoria and International 
Contracts:  A Challenge for International Commercial Arbitration?, 14 Am. U. Int’l L. 
Rev. 659 (1999). 
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which in some ways are analogous to the principles invoked in the south of the United 
States during the civil rights era.  Forty years ago, however, federal courts were invoking 
such principles to set aside rules that worked against African Americans.  Now it is the 
Canadians who charge discrimination by state courts, and in an ironic role reversal the 
federal government has become the champion of states’ rights. 
 Concerns expressed by opponents of NAFTA also overlap many misgivings 
raised in the so-called “globalization” debate, which has attracted so much attention by 
protests at international trade meetings from Seattle to Genoa.  Not all observers today 
accept Riccardo’s theory of comparative advantage, or share the assumption that cross-
border trade and investment (the circulatory system of globalization) bring the world a 
net benefit.  In particular such criticism is likely to be made by groups that in former 
times might have endorsed either socialism or the “New International Economic 
Order.”142  Such opposition was partly responsible for collapse of the OECD-sponsored 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment.143  
 Members of the U.S. Congress commend trading partners who accept 
international arbitration as a potential tool to address foreign trade violations.144  Yet 
when the U.S. is on the receiving end of a request for arbitration, protests are heard about 
                                                 
142  See discussion of Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, in Park, Legal 
Issues in the Third World’s Economic Development, supra.  
143  See Edward Graham, National Treatment of Foreign Investment:  Exceptions and 
Conditions, 31 Cornell Int’l L. J. 599 (1998).  In France, opposition to globalization 
under the slogan “L’AMI c’est l’ennemi” (“MAI is the enemy”) built on the double 
entendre of AMI (the French acronym for MAI as well as the word for friend).   
144   See 134 Cong. Rec. 26930-32.  Senator Jesse Helms (arch-opponent of restrictions 
on American power) urged the United States to withhold economic aid from Costa Rica 
until it agreed to arbitrate an expropriation dispute with an American citizen named 
J. Royal Parker.  See also, 146 Cong. Rec. H3031, concerning Turkey’s agreement to 
arbitrate investment disputes with foreigners. 
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“American laws being overridden” by NAFTA tribunals.145   American legislators warn 
against “sacrificing state and local laws at the altar of ill-defined international investor 
rights”146 and suggest that under NAFTA “the rights of an investor come before the rights 
to enact a chemical ban to prevent cancer.”147   
B. Playing by the Same Rules 
 Opposition to NAFTA by special interest groups within the United States has 
resulted in a retreat from the traditional level of American governmental support for 
binding arbitration as a means to protect foreign investment.  This policy shift is highly 
problematic, and ultimately will cause significant harm to American interests abroad.  
 Arguments that a federal government is not responsible for acts of state 
authorities toward foreigners (as in the context of Methanex, Loewen and Mondev) are 
not convincing.  The United States has long presumed that foreign governments must 
repair damage caused by political subdivisions.148 Indeed, the complaints by the 
American investor in Metalclad arose from actions by a Mexican municipality, and in 
                                                 
145 See 145 Cong. Rec. at H-7368.  Statement by Rep. Shows (Mississippi) concerning 
amendment of HR 2670. 
146 Id., Statement by Rep. Tierney (Massachusetts). 
147 Id., Statement of Rep. Bonior (Michigan).  In the same debate Rep. Ros-Lehtinen 
(Florida) asked rhetorically, “Are my colleagues to allow families’ health and that of our 
children, our friends and neighbors to be threatened because of foreign bureaucrats?” Id. 
at H-7370. 
148  See Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (5th Edition) at 451, n. 107, 
giving examples of arbitrations in which federal states have been held responsible for acts 
of their constituent units, including the Youmans Claim (1926, RIAA IV at 110, the 
Mallen Claim (1927, RIAA IV at 173) and the Pellat Claim (1929, RIAA V at 534).   
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Calmark from actions before a Mexican state court.149] . Within the United States itself, 
notions of federal responsibility for local misdeeds have a long history.150  
 With delicate irony, a foreign claimant in at least one NAFTA case against the 
United States has noted the inconsistency between current American attitudes toward 
investment protection and longstanding efforts by the United States to promote “full 
protection and security” for the foreign assets of its nationals.  In Loewen, the United 
States advocated narrower interpretations of the concept of governmental “measure” and 
more restrictive rules concerning “denial of justice” and exhaustion of local remedies 
rules.  The Canadian investor’s Reply Memorial pointed out that as far back as 1818 the 
United States, in a pronouncement of Secretary of State (later President) John Quincy 
Adams had declare that “no principle of the law of nations [is] more firmly established 
than that which entitles the property of strangers within the jurisdiction of a country in 
friendship with our own to the protection of its sovereign by all the efforts in his 
power.”151   
                                                 
149  See discussion supra.  
150  In support of the so-called alienage jurisdiction of federal courts (covering disputes 
between aliens and American citizens), Alexander Hamilton argued that the “peace of the 
whole ought not to be left at the disposal of a part.”   Hamilton asserted, “The Union will 
undoubtedly be answerable to foreign powers for the conduct of its members.” See 
Alexander Hamilton, James Madison & John Jay, The Federalist Papers (No. 18, at 476, 
C. Rossiter ed. 1961), quoted in Gary Born, International Civil Litigation in United States 
Courts (Third Ed. 1996) at 11. 
151  Letter to Mr. de Onis, Spanish Minister (1818), reprinted in John Basset Moore, 
4 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Section 535.  See generally Loewen Group & 
Raymond L. Loewen v. Unitd States of America, Joint Reply of Claimant, 8 June 2001, 
at paragraphs 305-08 (available at www.naftaclaims.com) noting numerous 
pronouncements by the United States in the context of claims against Brazil, Mexico, 
Colombia, Iran and Zair emphasizing the affirmative obligation of the host state to ensure 
“full protection and security” to the property of American nationals. 
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 Cynics might say that one should not be surprised at double standards.  Selective 
application of procedural standards, however, can have profoundly disconcerting 
consequences for wealth creation and economic cooperation.  American legal principles 
tend to be exported.  Thus the United States should take special pains to project the 
qualities of fair play and evenhandedness that promote undistorted participation in the 
global marketplace.  In today’s heterogeneous world, cross-border investment will be 
chilled without a willingness of all countries to accept arbitration.  Sauce for the goose 
ought to be sauce for the gander as well.152  Promotion of procedural inequality can only 
backfire to injure the long-term commercial interests of investor states. 
 As a practical matter, the nature of anti-NAFTA rhetoric often captures popular 
sentiment more easily than the sound arguments against distortion of cross-border capital 
flows.  The lobby that invokes “pure air and water” and “sovereignty” has a message with 
a more urgent ring than the theme of international economic cooperation, notwithstanding 
the unfortunate aggregate consequences that flow from measures that discourage 
transnational wealth creation.  
C. The Free Trade Commission Notes of Interpretation 
 Initially the NAFTA countries had expected that the ebb and flow of arbitral 
wisdom would create a body of case law providing sound investment protection.  
However, NAFTA also included a safety valve that permitted member countries to 
interpret Chapter 11 through the Free Trade Commission.153    
                                                 
152 The French would say, one cannot have two sets of weights and measures: On ne peux 
pas faire deux poids et deux mesures. 
153  Article 1131(2) states, “An interpretation by the [Free Trade] Commission of a 
provision of this Agreement shall be binding on a Tribunal established under [Chapter 11 
Section B].” 
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 During the summer of 2001, however, the NAFTA Free Trade Commission 
issued Notes of Interpretation related to several matters currently sub judice in 
Chapter 11 cases.  Under the Notes of Interpretation, the requirements of NAFTA Article 
1105 were restated to indicate that a breach of another NAFTA provision or a separate 
international agreement will not in itself establish that “fair and equitable treatment” has 
been denied.154  Moreover, the Notes of Interpretation limit the meaning of international 
law to “customary” minimum standards, 155 thus preventing recourse to other sources of 
international law that might either impose or relax restrictions on host State treatment of 
foreign investors.156 
 To some, these Notes of Interpretation constitute de facto modification of 
NAFTA that departs from the original meaning of Chapter 11, and thus require approval 
pursuant to Article 2202 in accordance with “applicable legal procedures of each Party.”  
                                                 
154 See NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 
Provisions, 31 July 2001, Part B, reprinted in 13 World Trade & Arbitration Materials 
139 (December 2001).  In addition, the Notes of Interpretation address the criticism that 
Chapter 11 arbitration is not “transparent.” Under the heading “Access to Documents” 
the Notes provide that “Nothing in the NAFTA imposes a general duty of confidentiality 
on the disputing parties to a Chapter Eleven arbitration.”  In this context, it is worth 
noting that for decades before NAFTA, expropriation claims against developing countries 
had been arbitrated in confidential proceedings under ICSID, UNCITRAL and ICC Rules 
without complaint from the industrialized investor nations.  
155  The Free Trade Commission stated inter alia that Article 1105 “prescribes the 
customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens as the minimum 
standard of treatment to be afforded to investments of investors of another Party” and that 
neither “fair and equitable treatment” nor “full protection and security” require 
“treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required by the customary international 
law minimum standard of treatment of aliens.”   
156  For example, a Multilateral Agreement on Investment (reached in the future within 
the OECD or the WTO) might refine concepts such as “regulatory taking” in a way 
different from customary international law.  Or a WTO standards agreement might also 
become an issue.  However, while such a standards agreement might constitute 
international law, it is unlikely that it would relate to investor protection in the context of 
NAFTA.  
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One award has suggested that Notes of Interpretation which fail to respect the text of 
NAFTA would not be binding on arbitrators deciding Chapter 11 disputes.157 
 To date no satisfactory way has been found to resolve the potential conflict 
between the requirements for amendment under Article 2202 and the provisions of 
Article 1131 that permit Free Trade Commission interpretations.  If the requirement of 
proper approval for amendments is to make any sense, some limits must exist on the 
power of the Commission to change the meaning of the established text. 
The conflict does not yield to easy analysis.158  On the one hand, arbitrator 
disregard of Commission interpretations could result in different results by different 
tribunals, thus reducing the consistency and efficiency of investment arbitration. On the 
other hand, the Commission’s de facto amendment of NAFTA would imperil the stability 
and predictability of the investor protection regime so laboriously negotiated in 1994. 
Conclusion  
Until recently, the world of investment arbitration knew fairly clear lines between 
host and investor states.  Nations such as Libya and Mexico were the respondent host 
states; while the United States and Canada were the countries of the investor claimants. 
Today, however, the United States and Canada under NAFTA have tasted the flavor of 
                                                 
157  See Final Award in Pope & Talbot, 31 May 2001 (ordering Canada to pay $461,556 
plus interest in damages).  At footnote 37 (paragraph 47) the Award states, “[W]ere the 
Tribunal required to make a determination whether the [NAFTA Free Trade] 
Commission’s action is an interpretation or an amendment, it would choose the latter.”  
The Tribunal continued, however, that such a determination was “not required” and thus 
its analysis “proceeded on the basis that the Commission’s action was an 
‘interpretation.’”  Tribunal composed of Lord Dervaird, Presiding Arbitrator, Hon. 
Benjamin J. Greenberg and Mr. Murray J. Belman.  
158  Presumably attempts to address potential conflicts would require recourse to the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, art. 31, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 
39/27, entered into force 27 Jan. 1980, 63 AJIL 875 (1969), 81 I.L.M. 679 (1969).  
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being respondent host states in investment arbitrations, with the concomitant negative 
side-effects for economic self-governance.  
 Traditionally the United States promoted arbitration on behalf of American 
investors abroad.  However, NAFTA Chapter 11 has now made the country the object of 
attack in unwanted arbitrations brought by Canada.  One consequence has been that 
media, environmentalists, politicians and consumer advocates have called into question 
whether investment arbitration is compatible with sovereignty.  More significantly, 
discontent with the NAFTA has led to provisions in the Trade Act of 2002 aimed at 
restricting the type of arbitration provisions normally included in investment treaties.   
 As with any dispute resolution system, some elements of NAFTA investment 
arbitration may be open to improvement.  Clarification and adjustment may be in order.  
 However, it would be fundamentally unsound to call into question the use of 
neutral binding arbitration itself as the preferred means for resolving cross-border 
investment disputes.   Overly general critiques of investment arbitration risk doing more 
harm than good, in the end backfiring to injure both the long and short term national 
interests.  Assertions of “sovereignty” may end up being slippery and unhelpful 
abstractions,159 serving simply as a justification for the exercise of unfettered government 
power.160 
                                                 
159  Taken from the Latin super meaning “above,” sovereignty reflects a power said to be 
above others, a formulation used in various languages:  au dessus des autres, die höchste 
Staatsgewalt or por encima de los demás.  Historians sometimes talk of “Westphalian” 
sovereignty, derived from the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia ending the Thirty Years’ War in 
a way that granted substantial autonomy to local princes.  Other uses of sovereignty 
include reference to autonomy of political subdivision on certain matters and recognition 
of one state by another.  See generally W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human 
Rights in Contemporary International Law, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 239 (G. Fox and B. Roth eds., 2000) (exploring sovereignty of 
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 On occasion, the enhancement of national welfare through treaties facilitating 
economic cooperation will mean that domestic law must yield to international obligation.  
And at times arbitrators interpreting treaty provisions may render decisions with which 
national officials or special interest groups may disagree.  Indeed, it would be quite 
startling if such were not the case, since treaties and arbitration by their nature 
supplement national legislative and adjudicatory jurisdiction.  However, an occasional 
“wrong” decision is a small price for promoting aggregate gain to the public good 
through the type of broad cross-border investment fostered by arbitration, particularly 
during much of the last half century under the New York and Washington 
Conventions.161   
                                                                                                                                                 
populations in contrast to that of rulers); Stephen D. Krasner, Globalization and 
Sovereignty, in STATES AND SOVEREIGNTY IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (D. Smith, D. 
Solinger, & S. Topik eds.,1999). 
160 One scholar has referred to sovereignty as “the unique character of governments.”  
See W. Michael Reisman, International Arbitration and Sovereignty, 18 ARB. INT. 231, at 
237 (2002), adapted from 12th Annual Workshop of Institute for Transnational 
Arbitration, 21 June 2001, Dallas, Texas.  Professor Reisman writes, “[A]s students of 
international law learn early in their pupillage, the fundamental problems of law and 
society are usually insoluble and the most and the best one can expect are short-term 
experiments in solutions and accommodations, whose durability depends on many 
unpredictably variable factors. The unique character of governments is one of those 
predictably unpredictable variables.” 
161 See generally, Jagdish Bhagwati & T.N. Srinivasan, Trade and Poverty in the Poor 
Countries, 92 AM. ECONOMIC REV. 183 (2002); Patricia Auger & Michael Gasiorek, 
Welfare Implications of Trade Liberalization between the Southern Mediterranean and 
the EU, University of Sussex at Brighton,  Discussion Paper No. 80, at 22 (2001) 
(www.sussex.ac.uk/Units/economics/dp/dp.htm); Jagdish Bhagwati, Economic Freedom: 
Prosperity and Social Progress, 1999, delivered to the Conference on Economic Freedom 
and Development in Tokyo, at. 6-7 (www.columbia.edu/~jb38/papers.htm); Nicholas 
Stern, Globalization and Poverty, The World Bank (delivered to Institute of Economic 
and Social Research, Faculty of Economics, University of Indonesia) at 9-10 (2000) 
(http://www1.worldbank.org/economicpolicy/globalization/documents/Globalization-
Indonesia%20Speech.pdf.); CAMPBELL R. MCCONNELL AND STANLEY L. BRUE, 
ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES, PROBLEMS AND POLICIES (13th ed, 1996) at743; Paul A. 
Samuelson, The Gains from International Trade Once Again, 72 ECONOMIC JOURNAL 
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 If investment arbitration is to fulfill its promise, however, some mechanism must 
be found to promote greater sensitivity to vital host state interest.  Otherwise investor-
government arbitration may fall prey to public pressure arising from a backlash against 
investor victories in some of the more visible NAFTA arbitrations.162  In the larger 
picture, the ebb and flow of arbitration’s wisdom may have to accommodate political 
reality. 
 As in other areas where law and policy interact, the devil is in the detail.  It is less 
than self-evident what exactly should be done to reduce the prospect of harsh legislative 
                                                                                                                                                 
(1962) reprinted in JAGDISH BHAGWATI, INTERNATIONAL TRADE 181-82 (1969); JAGDISH 
BHAGWATI AND T.N. SRINIVASAN, LECTURES ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE 160 (1983); 
MAX J. WASSERMAN, CHARLES W. HULTMAN & RAY M. WARE, MODERN 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 382 (1971); Konrad von Moltke, An International 
Investment Regime? Issues of Sustainability (IISD 2000) (reviewing the debate over the 
centrality of investment to the development process); Press Release, 9 October 1996, 
WTO Report: Trade and Foreign Direct Investment, by Richard Blackhurst, Director of 
Economic Research and Analysis Division, and Adrian Otten, Director of Intellectual 
Property and Investment Division. www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres96_e/pr057_e.htm, 
(examining the interaction of trade and foreign direct investment); Robert E. Lipsey, 
Interpreting Developed Countries’ Foreign Direct Investment, working paper 7810, 
National Bureau of Economic Research, July 2000 (contesting the view that foreign 
direct investment is a major influence on capital formation, and suggesting that the 
primary role of foreign direct investment is to transfer assets and production from less 
efficient to more efficient owners and managers); Kala Krishna, Ataman Ozyildirim and 
Norman R. Swanson, Trade, Investment and Growth: Nexus, Analysis, and Prognosis, 
working paper 6861, National Bureau of Economic Research, December 1998 
(examining patterns of causation between income, export, import, and investment growth 
for developing countries); Robert E. Lipsey, The Role of Foreign Direct Investment in 
International Capital Flows, working paper 7094, National Bureau of Economic 
Research, April 1999 (examining  volatility and dependability of direct investment 
flows).  
162 See Michael Goldhaber, Czech Mate, in AMERICAN LAWYER 82 (MARCH 2002).  While 
generally positive about investment arbitration (indicating how an American investor was 
able to vindicate an expropriation claim against the Czech Republic), the article quotes 
David Rivkin of the New York firm Debevoise & Plimpton as warning of a hostile 
reaction should the Canadian investor win in the Loewen arbitration, discussed supra. 
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responses to NAFTA arbitration.163  Caution must remain a significant part of the process 
for bringing order to the resolution of investment disputes.   
 Governmental Notes of Interpretation of the type issued in the summer of 2001 by 
the three NAFTA member countries, may end up helping to promote reconciliation of the 
arbitral process and public interest.  However, for the Free Trade Commission to engage 
in de facto amendment of NAFTA would imperil the stability of investor protection, and 
in some instances might provoke arbitrator disregard of Commission interpretations.164  
In all events, solutions that rely on government screening of an arbitration’s substantive 
legal merits risk doing significant damage to the fabric of cross-border economic 
cooperation and wealth creation.165 
                                                 
163 For one recent comment on the role of arbitration in cross-border investment, see 
Charles H. Brower, II, Structure, Legitimacy and NAFTA’s Investment Chapter, supra, 
urging arbitration that would be subject to “review by a standing appellate tribunal, and 
supervised by an accountable, transparent, and publicly accessible Free Trade 
Commission….”  Id. at 93-94. 
164 See footnote 37 of Final Award in Pope & Talbot (at para. 47) discussed supra.  The 
process for amendment of  NAFTA requires approval in accordance with “applicable 
legal procedures of each Party.”  See NAFTA Article 2202. 
165 See discussion supra of H.R. 3005 and H.R. 3009. 
Appendix:  Survey of NAFTA Cases 
 
Cases against Canada 
 
1. Crompton 
Corporation 
6 
November 
2001. 
 
 
 
$100,000,000 
 
The investor filed an amendment to 
the Notice of Intent on 19 September 
2002. 
Articles 
1102, 1105, 
1106 and 
1110. 
Establishment of legal 
restrictions to the use of a 
chemical product for sowing. 
 
2. Ethyl Corporation 14 April 
1997  
$251,000,000 In July 1998 the Parties settled the 
case. 
Canada paid Ethyl US$13 million. 
Canada withdrew the applicable 
prohibition to the international and 
provincial commerce of the MMT 
gasoline additive. 
Articles 
1102, 1106, 
1110 
A statute banning imports of the 
gasoline additive MMT. 
3. Ketcham 
Investments 
Inc. & Tysa 
Investments 
Inc. 
22 
December 
2000  
$30,000,000 According to public information this 
arbitration was withdrew. 
Articles. 
1102, 1103, 
1105, 1106 
and 1110 
Measures related with the 
establishment of export fees 
under the U.S.-Canada Softwood 
Lumber Agreement. 
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4. Pope & Talbot, Inc. 24 
December 
1998 
$507,552,400 Interim award issued 26 June 2000. 
The Tribunal found no breach of 
NAFTA articles 1102, 1110 or 1106. 
Award on the merits issued 10 April 
2001. The Tribunal found that 
Canada had breached NAFTA article 
1105. 
Award on damages issued 21 April 
2002. The Tribunal ordered Canada 
to pay USD$461,566. 
Award on costs issued 26 November 
2002. The Tribunal ordered Canada 
to pay USD$120,200 plus interests. 
Articles 
1102, 1105, 
1106, 1110. 
Implementation of the U.S.-
Canada Softwood Lumber 
Agreement violates NAFTA. 
5. S.D. Myers 21 July 
1998 
$20,000,000 Interim award on the merits issued 
13 November 2000. The Tribunal 
found that there was a breach of 
NAFTA articles 1102 and 1105. 
Interim award on damages issued 21 
October 2002. The Tribunal ordered 
Canada to pay CND$6,050,000. 
Final Award on costs issued on 30 
December 30. The Tribunal ordered 
Canada to pay CND$350,000 (costs) 
and CND$500,000 (legal fees). 
Canada is seeking to set aside the 
award. 
Articles 
1102, 1105, 
1106, 1110. 
Ban on the export of 
polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) 
waste. 
 
6. Signa, S.A.* Not 
available 
Not available Not available. Not 
available 
Not available 
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7. Sun Belt Inc. 27 
November 
1998 
$10,500,000,000  Submission to Arbitration file 12 
October 1999. 
According to the available 
information this arbitration was 
abandoned. 
Articles 
1102, 1105, 
1110, 1118 
Suspension of a license on the 
export of water by British 
Columbia. 
8. Trammel Crow 
Company 
7 
December 
2001 
$32,000,000 The Parties settled this matter. Article 1105 Canada Post Corporation denied 
access to an open and transparent 
bidding process. 
9. United Parcel Services 19 January 
2000 
$160,000,000 On 22 November 2002, the Tribunal 
issued an Award on Jurisdiction 
dismissing claims under NAFTA 
articles 1105, 1502 and 1503. The 
Tribunal also rejected Canada's 
jurisdictional challenge to the article 
1102 claim and joined two other 
jurisdictional challenges to the 
merits. 
 
Articles 
1102, 1105, 
1502 and 
1503. 
Anti-competitive practices by 
Canada Post in a non-
monopolized market. 
 
Cases against México 
1. Adams et al 11 
November 
2000 
$75,000,000 Submission to Arbitration filed on 16 
February 2002. 
 
Article 
1102, 1105 
and 1110. 
Expropriation and discriminatory 
measures taken by the 
Government and the Supreme 
Court with respect to a property 
in Ensenada. 
2. Calmark Comercial 
Development Inc. 
11 January 
2002 
$400,000,000 Not available. Articles 
1105, 1109 
and 1110. 
Denial of justice by the courts in 
connection with a Joint Venture 
Agreement for a development in 
Cabo San Lucas. 
3. Corn Products Not 
available  
Not available  Not available Not 
available 
Not available 
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4. Fireman’s Fund 30 
November 
2000** 
$50,000,000 Submission to Arbitration filed 30 
October 2001. 
Submission from Mexico on 
jurisdiction filed 21 October 2002. 
Articles 
1102, 1105, 
1110 and 
1405. 
Government action allegedly 
favoring acquisition of peso 
denominated debentures owned 
by Mexican nationals over dollar 
denominated debentures owned 
by Fireman’s Fund. 
 
5. Frank 12 
February 
2002 
$1,500,000 Submission to Arbitration filed 5 
August 2002. 
Articles 
1102, 1105 
and 1110. 
Expropriation of beachfront 
property in Baja, California in 
August 1999. 
6. GAMI Investments 
Inc. 
1 October 
2001 
$55,016,808 Submission to Arbitration filed 9 
April 2002. 
Articles 
1102, 1105 
and 1110. 
Discriminatory and arbitrary 
regulation of the sugar industry. 
Expropriation on 3 September 
2001 of sugar mills. 
7. Halchette 
Corporation 
Not 
available 
Not available Not available. Not 
available. 
Not available. 
8. International 
Thunderbird Gaming 
Corporation 
2002 Not available Not available. Articles 
1102, 1103, 
1105 and 
1110. 
Gambling licensing. Closure of 
the investor’s gaming facilities. 
 
9. Karpa (Feldman)  April 1999 $50,000,000 Interim award issued 6 December 
2000 (jurisdiction). 
 
Award on the merits issued 16 
December 2002, finding Mexico in 
breach of NAFTA article 1102 and 
ordering payment of 
Mx$9,464,672.50 plus interest 
(Mx$7,496,428.47). 
Articles 
1102,1105 
and 1110 
Taxation measures. 
                                                 
* Amended Notice of Intent. 
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10. Metalclad 
Corporation 
October 
1996 
$90,000,000 Award on the merits issued 2 
September 2000 finding Mexico in 
breach of NAFTA articles 1105 and 
1110 and ordering payment of 
US$16,000,000. 
 
Award partially confirmed by court 
in Vancouver (2 May 2001). 
 
Supplemental reason for decision (31 
October 2000). 
Articles 
1105 and 
1110. 
State action denying a permit to 
open and operate a hazardous 
waste facility in La Pedrera, San 
Luis Potosi. 
 
11. Promotora 
Internacional Santa Fe 
Not 
available 
Not available Not available Not 
available 
Denial of construction permits 
for a development in Santa Fe, 
Mexico City. 
12. Robert Azinian 
(Desona) 
24 
November 
1996 
$17,000,000 Final award in favor of the Mexican 
government (1 November 1999).  
 
Articles 
1105 and 
1110 
Termination by a municipal 
authority of a concession to 
operate a landfill and waste 
management system in 
Naucalpan. 
 
13. Waste Management 
(I) 
(Acaverde) 
February 
1998 
$60,000,000 Award on jurisdiction issued on 2 
June 2000. The Tribunal found that 
the investor had not filed a proper 
waiver under NAFTA article 1121. 
Articles 
1105, 1110 
Payment under a concession for 
public waste management 
services in Acapulco. 
 
14. Waste Management 
(II) 
(Acaverde) 
27 
September 
2000 
$60,000,000 Award in favor of jurisdiction issued 
on 26 June 2002. 
Articles 
1105, 1110 
Payment under a concession for 
public waste management 
services in Acapulco. 
Cases against the U.S. 
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1. ADF Group Inc. February 
2000 
$90,000,000 Submission to Arbitration filed 19 
July 2000. 
 
Award issued on 9 January 2003. 
The Tribunal found in favor of the 
U.S. on the merits. 
Articles 
1102, 1103, 
1105 and 
1106. 
The Federal Surface 
Transportation Assistance Act of 
1982 and the Department of 
Transportation's implementing 
regulations requiring that 
federally-funded state highway 
projects use only domestically 
produced steel. 
 
2. Canfor Corp. 5 
November 
2001 
$250,000,000 Submission to Arbitration filed 9 
July  2002. 
Article 
1102, 1103, 
1105 and 
1110. 
U.S. antidumping, countervailing 
duty and material injury 
determinations with respect to 
imports of softwood lumber 
 
 
 
3. Doman Industries 
Ltd.  
1 May 
2002 
$513,000,000 Not available. Articles 
1102, 1103, 
1104, 1105, 
1110. 
U.S. antidumping and quota 
allocation determinations 
(softwood lumber). 
4. Kenex Ltd. 14 January 
2002 
$20,000,000 Submission to Arbitration filed 2 
August 2002. 
Articles 
1102, 1103, 
1105 and 
1104. 
The Drug Enforcement 
Administration's interpretation of 
the Controlled Substances Act as 
prohibiting the sale of products 
that cause THC 
tetrahydrocamaninal (THC) to 
enter the human body. 
5. Methanex 
Corporation 
2 July 
1999 
$970,000,000 Partial award on admissibility and 
jurisdiction issued 7 August 2002. 
 
Reformulated claim filed 5 
November 2002. 
 
Articles 
1102, 1105 
and 1110. 
California ban on the use or sale 
in California of the gasoline 
additive MTBE. 
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6. Mondev International 
Limited 
6 May 
1999 
$50,000,000 Submission to Arbitration filed 1 
September 1999. 
 
Award on the merits finding for the 
U.S. issued 11 October 2002. 
 
Articles 
1105 and 
1110 
Decision by the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts and 
Massachusetts state law. 
7. R. Loewen and 
Loewen Corporation  
29 July 
1998 
$725,000,000 Interim award on jurisdiction issued 
5 January 2001. 
Articles 
1102, 1105 
and 1110 
A Canadian corporation seeks 
damages for alleged injuries 
arising out of litigation in which 
the company was involved in 
Mississippi state courts. 
 
 
8. Tembec Corp. 4 May 
2002 
Not available Not available. Not 
available 
Not available 
 
